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I. INTRODUCTION
The Seven Years' War (1756-1763), known in North America as the
French and Indian War, was the first truly global conflict ever waged. Fought
in Europe and in the colonies, and spreading to the shores of five continents,
the war ultimately confirmed the global dominance of the British Empire on
land and at sea. The object of the struggle between France and Britain was
initially a limited one aimed at the defense of their respective North American
territories. The conflict's momentum grew with such speed and force,
however, that by 1758 it had become a war with few limits. For Britain and
France it was a struggle to demolish the enemy as a colonial and imperial
power.1
One of the key strategies the warring parties employed was the
destruction of enemy commerce, for each belligerent hoped to cripple its
opponent by strangling its access to the resources that enabled it to wage war.2
t J.D. Candidate 2006, Yale Law School. The author wishes to thank Michael Prichard, Eric
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1. The war was fought in Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. Britain
and Prussia were allied against France, Spain, and Austria. For a discussion of the development of the
war's aims, see 1 JULIAN S. CORBEfr, BRITAIN IN THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 10-29, 336-50 (1992).
2. For a discussion of the development of Britain's "blue water" strategy, whereby naval
domination would be used to destroy the enemy's economy, see JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER:
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The success of this strategy depended on the victor's ability to dominate the
seas through an exercise of naval power so assertive and energetic as to give
rise to a variety of questions of legal right.3 As historian Julian Corbett writes,
"[h]owever completely we may command it, [the sea] is not ours; we cannot
exclude neutrals from it; we cannot possess it; we cannot subsist upon it."'4 In
order for Britain to dominate the seas, it was forced to engage with these
realities in a direct, pragmatic, and constructive way. This engagement
occurred on two fronts: on the world's seas and in Britain's prize courts.5
Britain's struggle to dominate the seas precipitated a revolution in prize
doctrine. This revolution in turn effected a realignment in natural law theory
that brought the law of nations closer to a conception of legal positivism than
ever had been attained before. But why did these legal and intellectual
changes occur in the context of prize disputes, of all places? The answer to
this question resides in part in the singular character of prize disputes.
Standing at the intersection of state policy and international law, prize
disputes stem from questions of the wartime rights of neutrals and belligerents
alike. Moreover, prize courts were institutionally well suited for dealing with
such questions because prize court judges were closely linked with (or even
doubled as) Britain's foreign-policy makers.
Out of the legal disputes between British privateers and Dutch
merchants, two new doctrines developed-one in embryonic form and the
other fully crystallized. These rules were the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage
and the Rule of the War of 1756, respectively. The former legitimized trade
according to its intent as well as its content, stipulating that a sea voyage
including several intermediate stops could be considered a single, continuous
voyage between its original and final destinations.6 The latter doctrine held
that a neutral could not engage in a trade during time of war that had been
closed to it in time of peace. The rule made it exceedingly difficult for the
neutral to undertake, on behalf of the enemy, wartime trading activities the
enemy could not perform itself. Cumulatively, these principles affirmed that
the needs of the belligerent must override the trading benefits of privileged
neutrality.
This doctrinal shift constituted a defining moment in the historical
development of international law. It marked the departure, albeit incremental,
from the natural law tradition that had found its most systematic and
WAR, MONEY AND THE BRITISH STATE, 1688-1783, at 167-90 (1989). See generally PAUL KENNEDY,
THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY (1976).
3. For an account of Britain's struggle with these questions during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, see DAVID ARMITAGE, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 100-24
(2000).
4. 1 CoRBETr, supra note 1, at 308.
5. The term "prize" is derived from the French prise, which denotes a taking or capture.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989).
6. The international law scholar Herbert Whittaker Briggs writes that the "doctrine of
continuous voyage has been defined as an application of the general rule of law dolus non purgatur
circuitu that a person is not permitted to do by indirection what he is forbidden to do directly."
HERBERT WHITTAKER BRIGGS, THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE 11 (1926). Hence in time of
war, stops that a ship makes in neutral ports before visiting an enemy port may be deemed intermediate
stops rather than independent voyages. They are stops made en route to an enemy port in a single
continuous voyage. JAMES GANTENBEIN, THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE PARTICULARLY AS
APPLIED TO CONTRABAND AND BLOCKADE 1-3 (1929).
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compendious articulation in the legal writings of Hugo Grotius 7 to the
positivism that dominates international legal discourse to this day. The
Grotian conception of natural law was premised on the idea that man could,
by acting in accordance with his natural capacity for reason, deduce certain
universal laws binding upon all mankind. These natural laws governed the
conduct not only of men but of states, imposing on them certain obligations of
just conduct in war. It was upon this philosophical foundation that Grotius
developed a system of neutral rights shot through with themes of natural
justice, a system that one of his own countrymen would challenge a century
later. That challenger was Cornelius van Bynkershoek-lawyer, writer, and
president of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands.8 Bynkershoek's sparse
ethical framework rendered the just war concept that had been central to
Grotius' conception of the rights of war and peace irrelevant to the wartime
conduct of the neutral. He instead developed a framework of international law
so normatively impoverished that it bore closer resemblance to the legal
positivism that emerged in the late eighteenth century than to the natural law
tradition in which Bynkershoek was himself trained. 9
The years between 1756 and 1759 constitute the chronological core of
this analysis, for they were pivotal in the development of neutral rights
doctrine during the Seven Years' War. These years witnessed a diplomatic
crisis between the Dutch Republic and Britain over the former's status as a
neutral nation and a neutral trader during the war. Bound by a 1678 treaty of
alliance,' 0 the Dutch Republic was obligated to deliver military aid to Britain,
if not to enter the war directly. As its own naval and political strength waned
during the first half of the eighteenth century, however, the Republic opted to
do neither. Tension between the two governments reached the boiling point in
1756, when Dutch merchants accepted an invitation from France to assume
the French monopoly on Caribbean trade."
Dutch merchants began defying British blockades of French colonial
ports, thereby undertaking on behalf of the French a trade in goods that Britain
was fighting to suppress. Adding insult to injury, Britain was bound by a 1674
7. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), lawyer, scholar, diplomat, and adviser, bears titles ranging
from the "Miracle of Holland" to the "father of modem international law." Grotius wrote his seminal De
jure belli ac pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace) in 1625 while in exile from his native Holland. It
was the first attempt by any writer to present a comprehensive treatment of the law of nations, and it set
the standard for international legal scholarship for the coming centuries. The work was no mere
academic exercise to Grotius but a project "for the welfare of mankind," as he wrote it in response to the
bloodletting unleashed upon Europe by the Thirty Years' War. I HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC
PACIS LIBRi TRFS 9 (James Brown Scott ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625). For the impact of
Grotian thought on the development of international law, see H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in
International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1 (1946).
8. Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673-1743) wrote his works on international law with the
unique position of his native Netherlands in mind. Because of their geographic vulnerability, the Dutch
maintained a policy of neutrality during the great European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, while profiting from the maritime commerce these wars often generated. KINJi AKASHI,
CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK: His ROLE IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-114 (1998).
9. For a discussion of Bynkershoek's minimal reliance on natural law theory, see id. at 84-
85.
10. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, Mar. 3, 1678, Gr. Brit.-Neth., reprinted in 14
CONSOLIDATED T.S. 1675-1679, at 311 (Clive R. Parry ed., 1969) [hereinafter Treaty of 1678].
11. ALICE CLARE CARTER, THE DUTCH REPUBLIC IN THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 97-102 (1971).
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treaty 12 to uphold the protection of Dutch trading rights under the doctrine of
"free ships, free goods." This doctrine stipulated that goods belonging or
destined to a belligerent, but carried aboard a neutral ship, were to be
considered part of a licit trade and therefore not susceptible to capture and
condemnation as prize.' 3 This turn of events bought the Dutch a commercial
advantage at high cost to British wartime strategy. To the British, this blow
was particularly injurious, for the Dutch were not only reneging on the terms
of the 1678 alliance but were also helping the enemy carry out a trade that
Britain was struggling to crush.
In order to understand the significance of the doctrinal revolution that
emerged from this diplomatic and military crisis, this Essay will examine the
language of wartime rights as expressed in court records and official
correspondence of the period. Particular attention will be paid to the manner
and context in which statesmen, jurists, and pamphleteers invoked the law of
nations. Political pamphlets published during the war are invaluable to this
endeavor, for they shed light on contemporary understandings of wartime
rights, having been written to persuade both decision-makers and the general
public.
The period between the two world wars of the twentieth century
produced a spate of articles and monographs on the history of admiralty law
and belligerent rights, largely in response to legal questions arising from
World War 1.14 However, the history of British prize law and neutral rights
doctrine remains largely uncharted water, so to speak. Part of the problem is
historiographical: record-keeping in the British courts of admiralty was not
formalized until Lord Stowell took the bench in 1798.15 In addition, the extant
High Court of Admiralty records for the period with which this Essay is
concerned were not organized by the London Public Record Office until fairly
recently. Richard Pares' volume on colonial blockade and neutral rights
remains the definitive work on the history of prize law during the mid-
eighteenth century.' 6 Pares' scholarship is unassailable, but this Essay will fill
some gaps in his work.
To this end, this Essay will demonstrate how British prize courts
effected a doctrinal revolution that reflected Bynkershoek's assertion that it is
not the neutral's "duity to sit in judgment between his friends who may be
fighting each other, and to grant or deny anything to either belligerent through
12. Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 10, 1674, Gr. Brit.-Neth., reprinted in 13
CONSOLIDATED T.S. 1673-1675, at 255 (Clive R. Parry ed., 1969) [hereinafter Treaty of 1674].
13. See infra note 26.
14. World War I gave rise to many questions concerning the sovereignty of the seas and
neutral rights, particularly since the United States, a great naval power, remained neutral for part of the
war. It was in light of these questions that the Carnegie Endowment's Division of International Law
decided to publish the Mare Liberum in 1916. George A. Finch, Preface to 1 HUGO GROTIUS, DE lURE
PRADAE COMMENTARIUS (James Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams et al. trans., 1950) (1604).
15. Lord Stowell laid the groundwork for case law in the admiralty and prize courts, trying to
collect and compile cases into a coherent body of law. He hoped to establish a tradition of judicial
precedents akin to the common law system upon which civil lawyers could draw. E.S. ROSCOE, STUDIES
IN THE HISTORY OF THE ADMIRALTY AND PRIZE COuRTS 35-40 (1932).
16. RICHARD PARES, COLONIAL BLOCKADE AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS, 1739-1763 (1975). A
recent work by Richard Hill examines the development of prize law during the Napoleonic Wars.
RICHARD HILL, THE PRIZES OF WAR: THE NAVAL PRIZE SYSTEM IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, 1793-1815
(1998).
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considerations of the relative degree of justice."' 17 It will first explain why
British prize courts became the venue in which this philosophical realignment
took place, and how contemporary readings of Grotius and Bynkershoek
contributed to this change. The Essay will then explain how the British
discourse on Dutch treaty rights, molded in large part by military and
diplomatic exigencies, became a crucible for the viability of the free ships,
free goods doctrine. Finally, it will examine how the doctrines modifying free
ships, free goods emerged in the prize courts, redefining the scope of Dutch
neutral rights and the trajectory of neutral rights theory in Europe as a whole.
What will emerge is not only a historical narrative that recounts the genesis of
a particular set of legal norms, but also a case study illustrating how one
international legal norm may yield to another in response to wartime
exigencies.
II. THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND NEUTRAL RIGHTS
Naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that "[t]o sap the prosperity
upon which war depends for its energy is a measure as truly military as is
killing a man whose army maintains war in the field."' 8 Although penned
more than a century after the Seven Years' War ended, this observation helps
explain Britain's determination to strangle French access to colonial trade
during the conflict. Much of France's wealth, not to mention many of its raw
goods, derived from commerce with its West Indies colonies.' 9 In order to cut
France off from the material sources of its power, Britain imposed blockades
on French colonial ports and actively intercepted and captured French trading
vessels at sea. This Section will first explain how the Dutch, self-proclaimed
neutrals during the war, became an obstacle to Britain's attempts to strangle
French trade. It will then go on to show how the British prize courts became
the venue in which Britain attempted to remove this obstacle, and, finally,
how public discourse surrounding the conduct of the Dutch brought the
writings of Grotius and Bynkershoek to the forefront of legal debate.
A. Waging a Commercial War
Policing French maritime trade routes the world over required an
enormous exertion of British naval might. Britain not only deployed the Royal
Navy in this endeavor but also employed the assistance of privateers-
privately owned ships licensed by the Crown to intercept and capture
belligerent ships and goods on the high seas.20 Upon seizing a suspect French
vessel, the captor would bring its captive to the nearest British port in which a
vice-admiralty court existed to adjudicate the case. The court would condemn
as prize any ship found to have been engaging in an illicit trade, and the ship
17. 2 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI DUO 61 (James
Brown Scott ed., Tenney Frank trans., 1930) (1737).
18. NORMAN BENTWICH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR 88 (1907).
19. 8 LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 65-67
(1954).
20. PARES, supra note 16, at 1-17.
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and its cargo might be sold at an auction by order of the court.21 Proceeds of
the sale would return to the Crown, and a portion would be disbursed to the
captain and crew of the privateer that had effected the capture. This system
rendered privateering both an effective strategy by which to wage commercial
war and a lucrative enterprise for the privateer.
2 2
In order to circumvent British blockades, France invited foreign
merchant ships to carry the French colonial trade on its behalf. During
peacetime, France had allowed French-flagged ships to carry goods only
within its empire; but now, with French colonial ports blocked and the French
merchant marine targeted by British naval and privateer ships on the high
seas, France could no longer maintain its monopoly on shipping. Instead, it
opened the French colonial trade to neutral powers, particularly the Dutch,
who had a large merchant marine" and enjoyed privileged neutrality under the
1674 treaty with Britain.2 ' Under Article VIII of the treaty, all goods found on
Dutch ships would "be accounted clear and free, although the whole lading, or
any part thereof, by just title of propriety, shall belong to the enemies of his
Majesty.""
Thus bound by the 1674 Anglo-Dutch treaty to uphold the doctrine of
free ships, free goods,16 Britain found its ability to wage war against French
commerce severely compromised. Invoking the protection of free ships, free
goods, the Dutch began to do on behalf of France what they could no longer
do for themselves: navigate the trade routes of the French Empire. In so doing,
however, the Dutch were undertaking a private trade in goods that had very
public consequences.27 Joseph Yorke, the British ambassador to The Hague,2"
chastised three deputies of Amsterdam for "the Injustice of profiting off Our
Situation," reminding them of "the Impossibility of obtaining Peace for
Europe, if even Our Friends, under a Pretence of Neutrality carried on all the
Trade of our Enemies. 29
21. For a description of prize proceedings in British courts of vice-admiralty during the
eighteenth century, see 4 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 234-37
(1938).
22. Privateering was so lucrative that during the Seven Years' War, sailors in the Royal Navy
were known to desert the service in order to join the crews of privateer vessels. 7 LAWRENCE HENRY
GIPSON, BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 70 (1949).
23. 8 GIPSON, supra note 19, at 72-73.
24. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 8.
25. Id.
26. This doctrine held that non-contraband enemy goods aboard a neutral ship were to be
considered free and thus not subject to confiscation. The doctrine was activated on a treaty-by-treaty
basis during the seventeenth century as a means of circumventing the prevailing doctrine of robe, a rule
established by Francis I which held that "la robe d'ennemy confisque celle d'amy." SIR GEOFFREY
BUTLER & SIMON MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-71 (1928). An elegant
English translation of the phrase is impossible. Richard Pares explains that "[b]y the doctrine of Robe,
neutral property, whether it was a neutral cargo in an enemy ship or a neutral ship carrying enemy
goods, or even neutral goods in a neutral ship part of whose cargo was enemy property-all alike might
be forfeited." PARES, supra note 16, at 165-66. In this way the belligerent status of a ship or its cargo
might contaminate neutral property.
27. CARL J. KULSRUD, MARITIME NEUTRALITY TO 1780: A HISTORY OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING NEUTRALITY AND BELLIGERENCY TO 1780, at 69-71 (1936).
28. 8 GIPSON, supra note 19, at 7.
29. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard Holdemesse,
Secretary of State (Dec. 15, 1758) (on file with the London Public Record Office (PRO), State Papers,
Holland, 84/482).
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It fell to the British prize courts to determine whether this newly opened
trade was indeed lawful. Their answer, in turn, set the standard for acceptable
neutral conduct.3" The courts had first grappled with this problem during the
War of Austrian Succession (1741-1748) in a series of cases that laid the
groundwork for the Rule of the War of 1756. During the War of Austrian
Succession, the British Navy, aided by privateers, was able to defend
commerce and wage war while a large merchant fleet carried on British trade.
By 1756, however, half a century of war had thinned the French naval and
merchant fleets to the extent that the country could no longer carry on a robust
trade using its own ships.3" While France needed neutral ships to undertake its
colonial trade on its behalf, British ships could keep the empire's navigation
self-sufficient.
B. The Role of the Prize Courts
Britain's prize courts felt the growing pains of British sea power acutely.
During the Seven Years' War, the Dutch grudgingly conceded to those courts
jurisdiction over cases involving their ships only because diplomatic
alternatives were unavailable. Rather than confront standing treaties head-on,
it was more politic to allow judicial processes to resolve what diplomacy
could not.32 Theoretically, the law of nations and treaty law should have
supplied a stable and predictable backdrop against which prize disputes could
be resolved, regardless of the state to which the court belonged.3 In actuality,
though, the application of different doctrines of neutral trading rights from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction hindered the development of a system of law
capable of transcending national lines. Thus while a British lawyer might
content himself to write that British prize courts were "not less the Courts of
the Captured, than of the Captor,"3 the Dutch States General argued that the
problem of prize cases "should not depend on the opinion of a judge, but
should be settled according to the mutual consent of the two powers."3
The conflicting views of prize litigation held by the Dutch and the
British stemmed in part from the curious nature of prize disputes themselves.
From a legal standpoint, prize cases are a mixed breed: a captured trading
30. In a sense, this standard-setting role for the courts reflects Grotius' idea of justice as
articulated in De jure belli ac pacis. He writes that what is lawful in war is also just, "and that, too,
rather in a negative sense than in an affirmative sense, that being lawful which is not unjust." 1
GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 34.
31. James C. Riley points out that "[i]n 1756 France could put to sea forty-five ships of the
line and thirty frigates against Britain's sixty ships of the line (of eighty-nine in paper strength) and fifty
frigates (of seventy)." By 1759, the French navy had been crushed while merchant ships were paralyzed
within blockaded harbors. JAMES C. RILEY, THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE:
THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL TOLL 80-83 (1986).
32. A more complete analysis of the diplomatic context can be found in Section lII.C, infra.
33. 2 ARTHUR BROWNE, A COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW, AND OF THE LAW OF THE
ADMIRALTY 224-25 (1840).
34. JAMES MARRIOTT, THE CASE OF THE DUTCH SHIPS CONSIDERED 36 (1759).
35. Extrait du Registre des Resolutions de Leurs Hautes puissances, Les Seigneurs Etats
generaux des provinces Unies des pais bas [Extract from the Register of the Resolutions of Their
Lordships, the Lords of the Estates General of the United Provinces of The Netherlands] (Jan. 25, 1759)
[hereinafter Extrait du Registre] (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/482) ("ne doitpas
dopendre de I 'opinion de juge mais qu 'elle doit uniquement 6tre reglie par le consentement mutudil des
deux Puissances").
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vessel and its cargo may be both private and public in character at once. As
private property, the ship and its cargo may belong to private individuals. Yet
as part of international trade, the same ship and cargo participate in an activity
with public implications. The benefits derived from this property are likewise
twofold. The private owner may be the direct beneficiary of trading or
36
carrying the goods, but national commerce benefits from the trade as well.
During wartime, this split personality has profound legal implications, as trade
in certain types of private property may be forbidden according to its public
consequences.37 The destruction of enemy trade may therefore become the
primary strategy of war.
What made harmonizing prize doctrines across borders particularly
difficult for Britain was the unique way in which it conducted its wars. During
the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, Britain hired
individuals-privateers-to execute naval policy on a larger scale than ever
before by any other country. In return for their service, privateers were
entitled to a large share of the proceeds from the ship's condemnation as
prize. 38 Hence, some of the responsibilities of waging public war were
devolved to private individuals. The presence of private persons as litigants in
prize cases further complicated the nature of the suits. Four sets of interests
were involved in most prize disputes: two private litigants claiming ownership
of the vessel or cargo on trial, and their two respective governments trying to
uphold national rights in war.
Since the majority of British prize cases arising during the Seven Years'
War involved private individuals as claimants, the British Admiralty began
seeing these cases as private property disputes that happened to overlap with
questions of state policy. If it were simply a question of intercepting enemy
cargo for defensive purposes, prize appeals could probably have found
ultimate resolution through political or diplomatic bargaining because the
stakes of disputes would have been primarily political and military. However,
the court had to take into account an entirely different set of rights-those of
the privateers. The stakes of capture were personal and financial as well as
political and military, for British privateers represented the interests of the
state only insofar as those interests enabled them to profit.
Throughout the early years of the war, British Secretary of State
Holdernesse and Joseph Yorke, ambassador to The Hague received letters and
delegations from the Dutch Republic, requesting the Crown's assistance in
securing the provisional release of captured ships pending appeal, for while
Dutch representatives assured the Crown "that they [had] entire confidence in
the judgement of the Lords ... they [could not] have the same confidence in
the inferior courts. 3 9 Without fail, the government's emphatic response was
36. NORMAN BENTWICH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR 87 (1907).
37. The entire notion of contraband hinges on this idea. Trade in any goods that would
increase the strength of the enemy may be declared unlawful in wartime. See FREDERIC THOMAS PRATT,
LAW OF CONTRABAND OF WAR 17-55 (1856).
38. PARES, supra note 16, at 1-76.
39. Protocolle presented by the deputies of the States General, presented to Richard, Earl of
Holdemesse, Secretary of State (May 18, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland,
84/484) ("Qu 'ils ont une Confiance entire dans le Jugement des Lords... Us nepeuvent avoir la mime
Confiance duns les Cours inferieures.").
The Seven Years' War
that such intervention in judicial procedure would compromise the integrity of
the British constitution. As Holdemesse wrote, "His Majesty cannot alter the
Methods prescribed by the Laws of His Kingdoms & by Treaty.",40 Even if he
wanted to,
the King [could not], of His own Authority, give up Ships or Cargoes, that by a Decision
in the Court of Admiralty [might] become the property of the Captor, who [had] also a
Right to insist upon a regular Trial .... Nor [was] it in the Breast of the Crown to
determine Points relating to Captures, otherwise than through the Channel of His Courts
of Justice; And it [was] by their Adjudication only, that the Truth of the Allegations, on
either Side, [could] be duly ascertained.4 1
Not only did the structure of the British constitution proscribe Crown
intervention in judicial procedure, but the process of prize adjudication was
established by the very same Anglo-Dutch treaty that had established the free
ships, free goods doctrine.42 Hence the two sovereign nations had endorsed
the principles and procedures employed in prize courts when the relevant
treaties were signed. Put bluntly, it was too late for the Dutch to complain
about a judicial process they had previously approved.
Richard Lee's 1759 Treatise of Captures in War describes the judicial
procedure established by the 1674 Anglo-Dutch treaty. Generously referred to
as a translator of Bynkershoek43 (less generously as "an inferior hack writer of
the Seven Years War"44), Lee closely patterns his treatise after the first book
of Bynkershoek's Quaestionum juris publici. The textual variations that do
occur are striking, often speaking to contemporary problems. For example,
Lee's chapter Of the Method of Trying Prizes Taken in War is conspicuously
absent from Bynkershoek. In it, Lee tells the reader that "by the Maritime Law
of all Nations, universally and immemorially received," prize cases must be
heard in "a regular judicial Proceeding, wherein both Parties may be heard,
and Condemn[ed] thereupon as Prize, in a Court of Admiralty judging by the
Law of Nations and Treaties. 45 The court is to belong to the captor state,46
and the burden of proof will rest upon the captive.47 Each country will uphold
the decision of the other's courts, and neither will tolerate abuses by its own
privateers.4
In the event of an appeal, the treaty of 1674 required that the king "cause
a review and examination thereof to be made in the assembly of the states
general in his council, that it may appear whether the orders and precautions
40. Letter from Richard, Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British
Ambassador to The Hague (Feb. 9, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/483).
Marriott less ceremoniously reminded the Dutch that "[iln Despotic Governments, as in Turkey, Judicial
Proceedings are short and precipitate, because they are arbitrary." MARRIOTT, supra note 34, at 34.
41. Letter from Richard, Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British
Ambassador to The Hague (Dec. 13, 1758) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/482).
42. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 8.
43. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 147-48 (1950).
44. PARES, supra note 16, at 155. Lee omitted Bynkershoek's introduction, concealing the true
author's identity and passing the work off as his own. Only in 1803, when Quaestionum juris publici
was re-translated into English, was the true author's identity revealed. Id.
45. RICHARD LEE, A TREATISE OF CAPTURES IN WAR 238-39 (1759).
46. Id. at 239; Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, arts. 11-12.
47. LEE, supra note 45, at 241; Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 7.
48. LEE, supra note 45, at 240-41; Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, arts. 14-16.
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prescribed in this treaty have been observed.", 49 This provision accurately
reflects the original nature of the Lords Commissioners of Prize Appeals, for
they were simply privy councilors charged with the responsibility of hearing
prize cases in wartime. As members of an executive body with close ties to
the king, and as architects of state policy, the Lords Commissioners were in a
position to negotiate the release of ships. They also wielded the ultimate right
to interpret treaties on a case-by-case basis. At some point in time, however,
the Lords Commissioners began to see themselves not as an ad hoc committee
of the Privy Council but as judicial officers presiding over an independent
court of law.50 Thus by 1759, Lee referred to them as "a superior Court of
Review, consisting of the most considerable Persons,"5t and admiralty lawyer
James Marriott berated Dutch merchants seeking extrajudicial intervention on
their behalf. 52
This institutional change also helps account for the role the prize courts
played in realizing the philosophical realignment that occurred during the
Seven Years' War with respect to neutral rights. Once the Crown was
marginalized from actively defining wartime rights, neutral rights would
henceforth be defined by members of the Prize Court of Appeals. Therefore, it
is partly in the courts of law that the origins of the two doctrines that set this
realignment in motion may be found. The system of neutral rights that the
prize courts would ultimately champion found its first formulation in the
writings of Bynkershoek, and it was to those writings that judges referred in
rendering their decisions in prize cases of the Seven Years' War. It is
therefore useful to offer a sketch of the system of neutral rights that
Bynkershoek proposed in his 1737 Quaestionum juris publici, the text that
became a focal point of the debate on the scope of neutral trading rights
during the war.
49. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 12.
50. The transformation of the Lords Commissioners from a conciliar body to a judicial one
has yet to be explained. Pares touches upon the question in an examination of the changing membership
of the appellate prize court. PARES, supra note 16, at 102-08.
51. LEE, supra note 45, at 241. It is worth noting that Lee dedicated the treatise to John
Carteret, Earl of Granville and president of the Privy Council, "whose consummate skill in affairs of this
matter [i.e., wartime captures]; whose peculiar station render[ed him], at this critical conjuncture, the
proper umpire in all disputes related to them; and whose rank and dignity, penetrating judgment;
impartial justice, and uncommon humanity, lay a just claim to the patronage of such a performance." Id.
at A1-A2. As president of the Privy Council, Granville was required to preside over the Prize Court of
Appeals. PARES, supra note 16, at 105. By the Seven Years' War, he was an old hand with regard to
prize cases, having served as a Commissioner of Appeals in the War of Austrian Succession. Id. at 93-
94. It is also worth noting Granville's opinion about the destruction of commerce as a wartime strategy.
At the very outset of the war, a meeting was held by Secretary of State Newcastle's ministers to
determine how to proceed against France on the seas. At the meeting, Granville, a politician who, "but
for his despotic temperament and incorrigible love of drink, his contemporaries believed to be worthy to
rank with the greatest statesmen," 1 CoRBETr, supra note 1, at 33, derided the policy of the destruction
of commerce as tantamount to "vexing your neighbours for a little muck." Id. at 61. For Granville's
views on neutral trade with belligerents in wartime, see PARES, supra note 16, at 183-84.
52. Marriott wrote that the British ministers had "shewn at once their Justice, and their
Patience, the one, in searching out, and delivering over Offenders to the civil Power, and the other, in
hearing with Attention the repeated, importunate, and unreasonable Complaints of those who have
forgot, that the sovereign Power itself in Britain is subject to the Laws." JAMES MARmioT-r, A LETER TO
THE Durci1 MERCHANTS IN BRITAIN 27 (1759).
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C. Bynkershoek on Neutrality
Before examining the legal frameworks that Grotius and Bynkershoek
developed, a word on the reception of their ideas is in order. While it may be
tempting to the modem reader to dismiss the writings of these jurists as
historical or philosophical curiosities, that temptation necessarily subsides
when the texts are instead considered in the context of eighteenth-century
legal practice. In their lifetimes, Grotius and Bynkershoek were first and
foremost lawyers and jurists-technical practitioners who had, in their own
day, written in direct response to prize disputes.5 3 Consequently, their legal
works do not read like purely philosophical tracts but rather like the legal
compendia their authors intended to write. Penned for use by the legal
practitioner, Grotius' De jure belli ac pacis (1625) and Bynkershoek's
Quaestionum iuris publici (1737) were treated by lawyers and by courts as
authoritative sources of law.5 4 As the British Admiralty grappled with the
legal fallout of the Seven Years' War, judges, lawyers, and statesmen alike
found in Grotius and Bynkershoek their juridical lodestars and relied on their
works in formulating legal arguments and judicial decisions.
In Quaestionum juris publici, Bynkershoek wrote that "war is by its very
nature so general that it cannot be waged within set limits."5 5 It must be
pursued on the assumption that the enemy deserves to be destroyed-he is a
criminal in the belligerent's estimation and must be punished accordingly.
Given the scale on which the great powers waged the Seven Years' War, this
expansive view of war must have had a certain resonance for readers of
Bynkershoek in the mid-eighteenth century. Unlike Grotius before him,
Bynkershoek did not offer a conception of just war fought by morally just
means; any means employed in waging a war to "defend or recover one's
own" (]us suum) 56 was just to Bynkershoek. Since "the reason that justifies
war justifies every method of destroying the enemy," nearly all means
conducing to victory were lawful to him.57 Although certain measures against
53. This historical fact demonstrates, in the first instance, how intellectually fertile prize cases
were for the cultivation of ideas about international right, and, in the second instance, how persistent the
problems of right to which prize cases gave rise would be. Grotius wrote his De indis between 1604 and
1605, at the age of twenty-one, as a defense of the Dutch East India Company's forcible attempts to
open Portuguese-dominated trade routes in the Indian Ocean and Indonesian Archipelago. See FINCH,
supra note 14, at xii-xv; RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 79-82 (1999); C.G. Roelofsen, Grotius and the
International Politics of the Seventeenth Century, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
95, 103-04 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990).
54. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence and Its Contribution to
European Private Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1685, 1712-13 (1992).
55. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 16.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 16-17. While Grotius will not allow such measures as poison or assassination in war,
1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 651-56, Bynkershoek does. "We make war," he writes, "because we think
that our enemy, by the injury done us, has merited the destruction of himself and his people." That said,
"does it matter what means we employ to accomplish it?" The only wartime measure that Bynkershoek
categorically prohibits is perfidy, on the grounds that once a compact has been made between
belligerents, they are no longer enemies. Their legal status changes and the rules governing their conduct
towards one another must change accordingly. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 16.
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the enemy might not be generous, generosity in war was dispensable to
Bynkershoek. Justice, on the other hand, was not.
5 8
In times of war, Bynkershoek explained, normal social obligations break
down; the respect due to property rights in peace gives way to the
belligerent's right to destroy his enemy by any and all means necessary.
Among these lawful means is the seizure of enemy property, for "such goods
are a part of the hostile power, [and] can be of use to them and hence harmful
to us."5 9 Grotius likewise justified the seizure of enemy property from non-
enemy parties; he did so, however, through a conception of necessity firmly
rooted in natural law. Indeed, to Grotius, "necessity is the first law of
nature." 60 From it springs the very institution of private property.
Grotius wrote that in the state of nature, men held all things in common.
In this way, they were able to use the natural world as need required.
However, some things (e.g., food, clothing, or shelter) could not be possessed
in common, for one person's use of them rendered use by another person
impossible. Herein lay the seeds of private property rights.61 By occupying
property through physical attachment, an individual could stake his claim to
exclusive ownership.62 Grotius insisted that these private property rights were
instituted not to supplant common ownership but with the "intention to depart
as little as possible from natural equity" 3 for the "law of property was
established to imitate nature." 64 As a result, men could revert to their right to
use whatever was necessary to preserve their own lives in accordance with the
original community of property, even if that property was owned by someone
else. For, wrote Grotius, the "first right ... that, since the establishment of
private ownership, still remains over from the old community of property, is
that which we have called the right of necessity.
65
Bynkershoek challenged the Grotian view head-on: "This I can not at all
approve, namely, Grotius' argument ...about the withdrawal from [the t
original community and about the ways of acquiring ownership."
Bynkershoek agreed that physical occupation was the means by which
humanity instituted private property, but he disagreed on the relevant motive.
It was not necessity that led to the development of private property but utility,
58. Hence Bynkershoek's assertion that while justice allows a state to have a greater army and
better weapons than its enemy, generosity does not. 2 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 17.
59. Id. at31.
60. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 73.
61. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM: THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 23 (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1609).
62. For a discussion of the Grotian view of private property, see STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL
LAW AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-52 (1991). Buckle examines the development of the idea of property in
Grotius' writings, taking into account the thinkers who influenced him, including Seneca, Cicero, and
Aquinas.
63. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 193.
64. GROTIUS, supra note 61, at 25.
65. Grotius qualifies this right, explaining that before men may act on it, they must first make
certain that this radical measure cannot be avoided through an appeal to civil authorities or to the owner
of the property. Furthermore, a man cannot be dispossessed of his property if he has equal need of it,
and, whenever possible, the property seized should be restored. Id. at 194-95.
66. CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS DISSERTATIO 37 (Ralph Van Deman
Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1923) (1744).
The Seven Years' War
a measure of the usefulness of an object in proportion to its desirability.
Necessity, Bynkershoek wrote, need not have anything to do with the utility of
an object, as is evidenced by human greed. Regardless of whether "necessary
or useful, [men] would attach themselves.., by natural occupation, that is, by
corporal seizure of the things they desired; for by mere intent a single man
could easily gobble up even the whole world." Hence man's passions are
checked, at least in part, by his simple inability to own what he does not
physically occupy.
67
These disparate assumptions shaped each writer's conception of neutral
rights, for insofar as war plunges men into the state of nature, human nature
determines what sort of conduct is acceptable in war. To Grotius, man's
inherent natural desire for peaceable society 68 entitled him-even obligated
him-to sit in judgment of the belligerents, doing nothing to disadvantage the
just side and nothing to advantage the unjust one. To Bynkershoek, however,
man's natural self-interest dictated the opposite conclusion. Men are neither
obligated nor even empowered by the laws of nature to take sides in war.
Instead, the neutral's duty in war is to be a friend to both belligerents without
influencing the relative strength of either.
Grotius reconciled the rights of the belligerent with the duties of the
neutral by requiring both parties to converge on the question of justice.
However, because Bynkershoek held that the justice of neither cause should
be of interest to the neutral unless its own life and possessions are directly
threatened, he constructed a system of neutral rights that anticipated an
inevitable clash between neutral and belligerent rights. Bynkershoek
considered all parties justified in protecting their lives and property in war;
consequently, the neutral is as entitled to uphold its commercial interests as
the belligerent is to seize contraband from neutral ships.69 Neutral and
belligerent must reach an accommodation through a mutual acknowledgment
of the legitimacy of one another's rights. Thus while Bynkershoek argued that
a belligerent may seize enemy contraband on the high seas aboard a neutral
ship, the belligerent is not entitled to seize the ship itself or do any harm to the
neutral. His right to encroach upon the rightful property of another is
coextensive only with their state of enmity, which, in the case of the neutral
trader, is represented by the enemy goods traded.
67. Id. at 38.
68. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 11-13.
69. This conflict of two equally legitimate claims of right is reminiscent of a passage in
Hobbes' Leviathan concerning the right of every man to refuse to die himself or to kill any other man
upon the command of the sovereign. "Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight
against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall with death, may
neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 151 (Richard Tuck
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1651). The relationship between Hobbes and Grotius has been
discussed masterfully by Tuck in a number of works. See TucK, supra note 53; Richard Tuck, Grotius.
Carneades and Hobbes, in GROTIUs, PUFENDORF AND MODERN NATURAL LAw 43 (Knud Haakonssen
ed., 1999). Although a study of neutrality in Hobbes would be a fruitful intellectual enterprise, it is
beyond the scope of the present Essay. Because the prize courts considered the juridical writings of
Grotius and Bynkershoek legally authoritative, this Essay will focus exclusively on their influence as
documented in the case records of the Seven Years' War. Although it is quite plausible that political
philosophers such as Hobbes helped shape the thinking of legal practitioners, jurists were more
frequently cited in courts of law.
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Grotius used a composite standard to determine the legitimacy of
wartime trading rights, taking into consideration the necessity of the
belligerent's situation and the nature of the property traded. He identified
three types of goods supplied during war: goods that are useful only in war
(e.g., weapons); goods that are of no use in war (e.g., luxury items); and,
finally, goods that are useful both in war and peace (e.g., naval stores). With
respect to the last category, Grotius recommended that the law use particular
wartime exigencies to determine whether such goods can be confiscated on
grounds of necessity. He wrote that if a belligerent is unable to protect himself
"without intercepting the goods which are being sent to the enemy, necessity.
. . will give [him] a right to intercept such goods, but with the obligation to
make restitution." 70 Thus Grotius would support the confiscation only of
enemy goods that compromise the belligerent's ability to vanquish his enemy.
Bynkershoek was troubled by this proposition, wondering precisely who
would judge the necessity of confiscating such property. 7 1 It seemed self-
evident to him that the belligerent alone would be able to judge accurately
whether certain types of commerce threaten its security. Since "all laws
prohibit men from sitting as judges in their own case except in so far as
custom, the prince of tyrants, permits it,' '72 it was in custom that he sought an
answer. After examining standing treaties and established practice,
Bynkershoek concluded that, according to custom, a neutral may, with the
exception of contraband, "carry anything to [belligerents] with impunity." 73
However, this right came at a cost. While Grotius required that the captor pay
the freightage for enemy property confiscated aboard neutral vessels,
Bynkershoek would hear nothing of it. The ship's master, he wrote, "took the
enemy goods on board at his own risk, knowing that they could be taken and
accordingly brought into the port of the captor. He will, therefore, have no
cause for complaint if the vessel is released empty.,
74
Bynkershoek's permissive framework for belligerent rights is matched
by a correspondingly broad system of neutral rights. This system differs from
the Grotian view in that Bynkershoek's conceptions of right are not
underpinned by a normative force sufficiently compelling to justify neutral
conduct that might have a bearing on the war's outcome. Bynkershoek
answered Grotius' proposition that the neutral must do nothing to aid the side
whose cause is unjust by reminding the reader that a neutral, as a friend to
70. 1 GROTrUs, supra note 7, at 602.
71. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 66.
72. Id. at 67.
73. Id. at 67.
74. Id. at 88-89.
75. Bynkershoek's laws of war derive from the sole principle that all measures employed in
attempting to destroy the enemy are lawful. Any proscriptions that Bynkershoek explicitly establishes
are deduced from this single rule. For example, the belligerent's right to confiscate all enemy property
and execute all enemies necessitates the cessation of commerce between nations at war. Bynkershoek
asks:
Of what value are commercial rights if, as is clearly the case, the goods of the enemy that
are brought in or that are found in the country are confiscate[d]? But so long as the right
of slaying an enemy obtains, would you approve that men might go to the enemy's
country with merchandise only to have some enemy cut them down in the midst of the
trading?
Id. at 29.
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both belligerents, "is not acting the part of a friend in ruining or in injuring in
any manner the cause of his friend" by delivering goods to either belligerent.76
The neutral is not in a position to assess the justice of either side's cause and
must behave accordingly, undertaking no action that might benefit or
prejudice either belligerent. Given the role the Dutch Republic would assume
during the Seven Years' War, it is little wonder that Bynkershoek's morally
sparse framework for neutrality was well received by British judges,
politicians, and lawyers seeking to rationalize a change in policy toward
Dutch neutrality.
77
When the Dutch Republic accepted the French invitation to participate
in the previously closed French colonial trade, it brought into question an
almost hundred-year tradition of privileged trading rights under the free ships,
free goods doctrine. Because the success of Britain's war against France
depended in large part on the ability of the former to suppress the enemy's
trade in goods essential to supplying the war effort, Dutch participation quite
directly challenged Britain's strategy. The treaty of 1674 authorized British
prize courts to determine whether violations of its provisions had occurred, 8
situating the courts at the heart of the Anglo-Dutch controversy over wartime
trading rights and, indeed, Dutch neutrality in the war itself. With respect to
the latter issue, the prize courts had to determine which of two conceptions of
neutrality would carry the day: the Grotian conception, according to which the
neutral's abstention from open hostilities in wartime did not impinge upon its
natural duty to aid the just side, or the Bynkershoekian conception, on which
the neutral's duty was to do nothing to help or hinder either side.
III. TREATY RIGHTS AND DUTCH NEUTRAL TRADE
On January 2, 1759, a hopeful Joseph Yorke, British ambassador to The
Hague, wrote to the Earl of Holdemesse:
By my last Letter, I had the Honor to give Your Lordship an Account of what had past
between me, and the Deputies of Amsterdam, as well as with the Ministers of the
Admiralties, to whom I have indeavoured to prove in the fullest manner, as contained in
Your Lordship's Instruction, the Right, His Majesty has to annull the Treaty of 1674,
from the Failure on the part of the States General, in the Execution of the Treaties
subsisting between the Two Nations, and in order to open the Eyes of the Publick, as
much as possible upon this Subject, I have had translated and published the best
79Pamphlets which have been written and published in England upon this occasion ....
After three years of private negotiation and public debate, a delegation of
Dutch officials confided to Yorke that they were prepared to make good on
overtures to relinquish formally their claim to the French colonial trade under
76. Id. at 72.
77. Bynkershoek's influence on British jurisprudence cast a long shadow. Arthur Browne, an
MP and professor of civil law at the University of Dublin, patterned his work on prize law after '[a] plan
not dissimilar to that of the celebrated Bynkershoek, who, seemingly deterred by the view of the same
vast ocean, though with incomparably greater powers to encounter it, selected for consideration only
those quaestiones publicijuris which are most frequently agitated." 2 BROWNE, supra note 33, at 244.
78. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, arts 1l-12.
79. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard, Earl of
Holdemesse, Secretary of State (Jan. 2, 1759) [hereinafter Letter from Yorke, Jan. 2, 1759] (on file with
London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/482).
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the 1674 Treaty of Navigation and Commerce. 80 By now Dutch trade was
feeling the impact of increasingly aggressive captures; a large part of the
country's merchant fleet was moored in British ports pending the trial of its
cargos.81 Maritime insurance rates were soaring to prohibitive heights as
Dutch ships, often insured by British companies, became moving targets for
privateers while in transit to or from North America.82 Promising as the
concession was for future diplomatic accommodation, any renegotiation of
Dutch trading rights would inevitably confront fierce opposition from what
Yorke termed "a whole Country of Merchants and Advocates." 3 It was in
anticipation of this impending clash that the ambassador commissioned the
translations. This Section will examine the views held by two leading British
pamphleteers on the 1674 treaty, noting the manner in which the authors
engaged with the Dutch tradition of neutral rights theory. It will explain the
relevance of these pamphlets to the diplomatic negotiations underway
between Britain and the Dutch Republic, and will demonstrate how diplomats
ultimately passed on the problem of reckoning with the 1674 treaty to British
prize courts.
A. James Marriott's Case of the Dutch Ships Considered
Although the archival sources do not name the pamphlets that Yorke
considered the best, James Marriott's The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered
seems a likely choice.8 4 First published in 1758, the pamphlet was so well
received in Britain that it was re-published three times over the course of the
85
next year alone. It was published once again in 1778, the same year Marriott
was appointed judge of the High Court of Admiralty. 86 In this pamphlet,
Marriott, an advocate at Doctor's Commons, presented a legal case to counter
Dutch claims, translating questions of the commercial rights of neutrals into
questions of property rights, and approaching treaties between states as though
they were contracts between individuals.
The core of Marriott's argument is a principle affirmed by "Writers...
of every Country, and of the highest Authority, and by the common Usage of
all Nations": every belligerent may seize and expropriate enemy property
80. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard, Earl of
Holderness, Secretary of State (Dec. 29, 1758) [hereinafter Letter from Yorke, Dec. 29, 1758] (on file
with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84(482).
81. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard, Earl of
Holdernesse, Secretary of State (Sept. 15, 1758) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland,
83/482).
82. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard, Earl of
Holdernesse, Secretary of State (Sept. 22, 1758) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland,
83/482).
83. Letter from Yorke, Dec. 29, 1758, supra note 80.
84. MARRIOTT, supra note 34. A survey of the pamphlets published during the Seven Years'
War shows that only the pamphlets by Jenkinson and Marriott were published in time for Yorke to
commission the translations into Dutch.
85. The second, third, and fourth editions of The Case of the Dutch Ships Considered were
printed in 1759. A copy held by the Cambridge University Library is inscribed with a dedication from
the author himself. Marriott was educated at Trinity Hall and subsequently served as its master from
1764 to 1802. RosCOE, supra note 15, at 28-29.
86. Id. at 28.
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wherever it may be found.87 An early articulation of this principle occurred in
the Consolato del Mare, perhaps the "common Usage of all Nations" to
which Marriott was referring. The Consolato was an early compendium of
European maritime custom that had long provided the basis for prize
provisions in commercial treaties. Not until the late seventeenth century did
commercial treaties begin to diverge from the Consolato's view of belligerent
property rights by including free ships, free goods clauses. 89 The treaty of
1674 represented one such divergence. Marriott therefore turns to it in order to
assess the legitimacy of the Dutch claim to free ships, free goods with respect
to the French colonial trade.
90
Marriott interprets the treaty article by article. As he writes, the
signatories become contracting parties and the treaty terms contractual
obligations. 91 The analogy is not original. After all, to Grotius, what were
treaties but "public contracts," differing from those of private persons only in
that treaties could "be made only by the right of a higher or lower authority of
government"? 92 Marriott likewise applies the same interpretive criteria to
compacts between states as to compacts between individuals, measuring the
validity of the treaty provisions in accordance with civil law contract
procedure. Within the civil law tradition, the validity of a contract was
contingent upon (1) whether it was concluded by "free and intentional
consent"; (2) whether it involved the participation of at least two parties; (3)
the intention as to its object; (4) the mutuality of its provisions; and (5) the
specification of the terms on which its provisions were to be fulfilled. 93
Relying on the substantive principles of Justinian's Digest94 and invoking the
philosophical authority of Grotius, Marriott embarks upon his argument.
From the standpoint of civil law, "free and intentional consent" could be
given to a contract only when the parties were recognized as legally eligible
and competent to sign, and when their consent was granted in the absence of
force or fear. Consent had to be granted bona fide-that is, in such a manner
as to demonstrate a genuine intention to fulfill the terms of the agreement. A
contract signed with the intention of defrauding the other contracting party or
a third party would be invalid.95 Since the two treaty parties fulfilled these
requirements, the problem was clearly one of construction. The only
remaining standards were based not on the legal status of the signatories but
on the content and context of the treaty itself. Therefore, to understand the
scope of the free ships, free goods clause, Marriott held that the interpreter
must determine three things: the object of the treaty, the terms on which its
provisions are to be enjoyed, and the course of action it prescribes.
87. MARRIOTr, supra note 34, at 2.
88. For a discussion of the Consolato, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 43, at 31-32.
89. KULSRUD, supra note 27, at 14-16, 153-55.
90. MARRIOTT, supra note 34, at 4. Marriott writes that the "whole Argument ... is rested
intirely [sic.] upon the Words of the Treaty of December 1, 1674." Id.
91. Id. at 436-41.
92. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 391.
93. 2 PATRICK COLQHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 436 (1851).
94. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN (Theodore Mommsen ed., Alan Watson trans., Univ. of Penn.
Press 1985) (1870).
95. Id. at 439-40; MARRIOTT, supra note 34, at 12.
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The object of the treaty, as the very title indicates, was navigation and
commerce. However, the source of current controversy was to which areas of
navigation and commerce the treaty applied. Marriott first turns his attention
to Articles I and II. Article I allowed the Dutch to navigate and trade freely,
unmolested by British ships, even if that commerce was carried out with an
enemy of Britain. This privilege extended in war as well as in peace. Article
II, however, stated that, with the exception of contraband, "such Freedom
shall extend to all Commodities which might be carried in time of Peace."96
Because it was forbidden for all but French ships to engage in the empire's
colonial trade during peacetime, it was forbidden for the Dutch to engage in it
during war. Thus Dutch trade with the French colonies was actually prohibited
by the treaty.
Marriott proceeds to argue that Article VIII, the free ships, free goods
clause, should be interpreted with these provisions in mind. Article VIII held
that any non-contraband goods belonging to the enemy of Britain found
aboard a Dutch ship were considered free. Yet it also stated that this provision
must be read "according to the Meaning and Direction of the foregoing
Articles." 97 Thus, if read in context, the free ships, free goods doctrine was
applicable only to those trades lawful in both war and peace. This
interpretation recognized the difference between allowing the Dutch to trade
with the enemy and for the enemy. At issue was not whether a neutral could
trade in non-contraband goods with the enemy, but whether a neutral could
undertake trade that had been limited exclusively to enemy ships before the
outbreak of war.
Marriott's next argument renders all these points practically irrelevant.
He writes that the treaty of 1674 "extends no farther in its Obligation than to
the general State of Commerce in existence, and view at the time of
contracting"98-that is, rebus sic stantibus. Because trade with the French
colonies was closed in peacetime and in wartime-when the treaty was
concluded-the signatories could not possibly have intended it to be the
object of the treaty. To include the French colonial trade within the scope of
the agreement is, to Marriott, simply anachronistic. He writes that, understood
within the historical context of the treaty, colonial trade was created "ex post
facto, [and] cannot be opened ...to the Subjects of Holland .. .so as [to
allow them] to carry it on by virtue of the Engagements subsisting between
Britain and Holland . . . prior not only to the Existence, but even probable
existence of this [trade]." 9
Marriott returns to the counterclaim "that by the Treaty of December
1/11, 1674, was meant a Right to trade with the Enemy in every Place and in
every Manner, possible, which it shall be in the Enemy's Inclination to allow
in time of War."100 He responds that this argument allows the enemy to
96. MARRIOTT, supra note 34 (quoting and translating the Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art.
2) (emphasis in original).
97. MARRioir, supra note 34, at 9 (quoting and translating the Treaty of 1674, supra note 12,
art. 8).
98. MARRIOTr, supra note 34, at 11.
99 Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
The Seven Years' War
become a third party to the obligation, as it can dictate retroactively the scope
of the agreement by opening or closing commerce at will. Apart from being
potentially self-destructive, such a compact is not valid according to the legal
concept of mutuality of obligation. In order for a contract to be valid, there
must be reciprocal benefits, each party contracting for no one's benefit but its
own. 101 Under these circumstances, France would be introduced to the
agreement as a shadow beneficiary without ever having to sign the treaty.
Marriott also argues that the opening of French colonial trade to the
Dutch can be viewed as a compact in and of itself. This compact, however, is
invalid because through it the French benefit from defrauding Britain. He
writes that no nation may enjoy a benefit through a fraud committed by
another on its behalf. Since the Dutch have been undertaking a trade for the
French, a trade not sanctioned by the treaty of 1674, such trade is tantamount
to fraud. The Dutch have thus become an instrument of French commerce by
acting "to the Detriment and Destruction. . . exfraude, and, ex posterior" of
the British. 102 They have violated the mutuality of the treaty by importing into
it the interests of the French.
Underpinning all these claims was the problem of the mode of the
contract-the manner in which its provisions were to be fulfilled. The terms
of the 1678 Treaty of Alliance compelled each party to give aid
unconditionally to the other in time of need. 103 Marriott writes that this
promise did not leave room for the Dutch to "judge of the Foundation for
requiring" aid,1°4 but rather categorically required them to deliver aid. Since
the States General neither delivered aid nor intended to offer it to Britain, they
violated the terms of the Anglo-Dutch alliance. As a result, whatever rights
the Dutch could claim under the treaty of 1674-itself now contingent upon
fulfillment of these obligations-have been forfeited because "the Non-
performance of part of an Alliance, is a Dissolution of the Whole, whatever
are the Reasons.'
0 5
Here Marriott refers the reader to Grotius' claim that "[i]f one party has
violated a treaty of alliance, the other will be able to withdraw from it; for the
individual terms of an alliance have the force of conditions."' 106 Marriott's
appropriation of this argument in the case of the Dutch merchants reflects one
of the most significant contributions that natural law theory made to the
development of civil contract law: the idea that each compact involves a tacit
agreement whose abrogation will restore the contracting parties to their
relationship prior to the obligation. If a promise is broken, all subsisting
compacts can be rendered null and void. Thus, in addition to being mutual, the
force of the obligation becomes conditional. 
10 7
101. See COLQUHOUN, supra note 93, at 443.
102. MARRIOTT, supra note 34, at 12 (citations omitted).
103. Treaty of 1678, supra note 10.
104. MARRIOTT, supra note 34, at 28.
105. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
106. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 405.
107. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION 803 (1990). Further discussion of the impact of natural law theory on the
development of contract law can be found in JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 112-33 (1991). Gordley provides a helpful account of the reception of
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Marriott is at his most lucid and commanding when he follows closely
the principles of contract law. It is only when he invokes "the common
Principles of the Law of Nature and Nations"'08 that his arguments become
opaque. Yet even at their most elusive, these latter claims are only ancillary to
a concrete legal argument on treaty construction. As Pares points out, British
lawyers, like political theorists of the period, could not agree on the origins
and nature of the law of nations. 10 9 Treaties, however, became a means of
extrapolating by negation the dictates of natural law: if a particular country
enjoyed a right or privilege exclusively by treaty, it meant that other nations
did not enjoy that right by the laws of nature and of nations. 1 Treaty rights
were thus seen as positive constructs built upon a foundation of natural law.
Remove these rights layer by layer, and eventually one would be left with a
core of irreducible principles constituting the law of nations. Marriott left the
task of mining this irreducible core of natural right to Charles Jenkinson.
B. Charles Jenkinson's Discourse
Charles Jenkinson, later Lord Liverpool, was aligned politically with
William Pitt in advocating a commercial war on France and seeking not "a
way round the Treaty of 1674... [but] a way through it" by having it declared
void.' In his 1759 pamphlet, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of
Great-Britain, in Respect to Neutral Nations, During the Present War,
Jenkinson attempts to combine the philosophical foundations of Grotian
natural law with the substantive principles of Bynkershoek's conception of
neutral rights. Jenkinson himself acknowledges this eclecticism, noting at the
outset of his pamphlet that he will first "produce the Testimony of that learned
Native of Delft [Grotius], who wrote so nobly on the Freedom of Navigation
to serve his ungrateful Country" and "add that of Bynkershoek, a Native also
of Holland... [who] wrote principally for the Use of the Courts and States of
the United Provinces [of The Netherlands].' 12
Jenkinson examines the rights of neutrals to trade in wartime from the
standpoint of both treaty rights and natural law. He ultimately agrees with
Marriott, concluding that the commercial treaty, as confirmed by a treaty of
alliance,
ought to be considered in the Nature of a Bargain; The Conditions of which are always
supposed to be equal, at least in the Opinion of those, who make it; He therefore, who
breaks his part of the Contract, destroys the Equality or Justice of it, and forfeits all
pretence to those Benefits, which the other Party had stipulated in his favour.
11 3
natural law theory among seventeenth-century jurists.
108. MARRIOTr, supra note 34, at 10. It appears that Marriott conceived of the law of nations
as simply an expression of natural law; to him, the two were identical insofar as the law of nations was
that aspect of natural law governing the conduct of nations to one another.
109. PARES, supra note 16, at 162.
110. Seeid.at156.
111. Id.at199n.l.
112. CHARLES JENKINSON, DISCOURSE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT-
BRITAIN, IN RESPECT TO NEUTRAL NATIONS, DURING THE PRESENT WAR 9 (Dublin, Halton Bradley
1759).
113. Id.at37.
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Jenkinson writes that, as amendments to natural law, treaties are capable
of perfecting, "by their Prudence, what Nature hath left imperfect." 114 Human
society, he notes, was founded through man's natural sociability. Bound
together by "the softer Ties of Natural Affection,' ' 1 5 men united for their
mutual benefit and relinquished to their governments the rights they had
enjoyed while living in the state of nature. First and foremost among these,
Jenkinson asserts, was the right to defend themselves and their property
against attack. 116 It was through this transfer of right that each nation became
an amplification of the individual, "subject to the same Passions and
Animosities, as the Individuals, of which [it was] composed.""' 7 While the
laws of the state control the passions of its members, no analogous institution
exists to control the passions of entire nations. Individual states are therefore
equivalent to individual people living in the state of nature: both live under the
rule of natural law.
Because the state could wield as natural right only those powers that its
members had transferred to it, treaties were "superadded . . . [by]
Communities . . . for their mutual Benefit," "18 affirming natural law or
guaranteeing what it did not explicitly grant. This view of treaties was very
much in keeping with Grotius' assertion that there are two sorts of treaties:
"some establish the same rights as the law of nature, while others add
something thereto."" 9 Treaties, along with custom and use among nations,
comprise a separate body of laws with origins in natural right and human
sociability-the law of nations. To Jenkinson, treaties are not, as Marriott
argues, simply contracts among nations; they are a means of fulfilling the
requirements of natural law in order to protect man's natural rights.
If free ships, free goods was a treaty right "superadded" to a natural
right, the question remained of what wartime conduct was permissible for a
neutral under the laws of nature. Here Jenkinson turns once again to the
individual-state analogy. If an individual living in the state of nature finds his
person or property under attack, he has every right under natural law to defend
them against his attacker. A third individual professing to take no side in the
dispute may not aid either party, for by aiding one side he diminishes the
other's ability to defend himself. In denying either disputant his natural right
to self-defense, the third party ceases to be neutral and becomes an enemy.
This observation also holds true among states. By supplying aid to a
belligerent, a neutral country encroaches upon the other belligerent's right to
defend himself. 20 Therefore,
[i]t is the Duty . . of those, who are not concerned in the Dispute, to be extremely
attentive to their Conduct, that they may not thereby contribute to render the Contest
unequal: As far as Man is concerned, it is Force alone, on which the Decision depends; to
add therefore by any means to the Power of one Party, is, manifest injustice to the
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at3.
118. Id. at6.
119. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 393.
120. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 6-7.
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Other.
12 1
Jenkinson's views are not novel; they are, by his own admission,
applications of old ideas to new circumstances.1 22 The Grotian perspective on
natural law is underpinned by a pervasive sense of moral obligation 123 that,
although minimal, casts a long shadow. Man's natural rights are derived from
four laws of nature: each individual may defend his own life; he may acquire
and defend his own property; he may not injure his fellow man; and he may
not arbitrarily seize the property of another.
12
Grotius states that rights may become "a moral quality of a person,
making it possible to have or do something lawfully." 125 A war fought in
defense of one's natural right is a just war.126 Far from being required to
abstain from moral judgment, according to Grotius, "it is the duty of those
who keep out of a war to do nothing whereby he who supports a wicked cause
may be rendered more powerful, or whereby the movements of him who
wages a just war may be hampered." 127 To Bynkershoek, however, "the
question of justice and injustice does not concern the neutral, and it is not his
duty to sit in judgement between his friends who may be fighting each other,
and to grant or deny anything to either belligerent through considerations of
the relative degree of justice." 128 It is the latter view of neutrality that
Jenkinson advocates.
Jenkinson synthesizes the views of Grotius and Bynkershoek, writing
that "the softer Ties of Natural Affection among [nations] have little Effect,
and no coercive Bands of Power exist to regulate and controul [sic.] their
Passions; it is the Virtue of Governments alone, on which the general
Prosperity depends, and Treaties have no better Sanction, than what that
Virtue can give them." 129 Treaties were instituted to preserve the equity that
nature established among men but that men's passions tended to subvert.
Jenkinson writes that men possess a natural right to enjoy commerce with any
country in war or peace, so long as trade is undertaken on their own account
and in their own goods. This sort of equitable trade, however, is often
subverted "amid the Irregularities of War."'130 Treaties are therefore concluded
to confirm man's natural rights to trade, but they also occasionally create
privileges not guaranteed by nature. The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674 did
both.' 31 In allowing each country to enjoy non-contraband transactions with
the enemy of the other, the treaty upheld their natural right to trade. In this
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Knud Haakonssen, Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought, in GROTIUS,
PUFFENDORF AND MODERN NATURAL LAW, supra note 69, at 35, 46-49.
124. For a discussion of Grotius' views on natural rights, see Tuck, supra note 69, at 85. Tuck
also discusses the manner in which Grotius developed an ethical theory based on human self-interest. Id.
at 43-61.
125. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 35.
126. Id. at 52-53.
127. Id. at 786.
128. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 61.
129. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 55.
130. Id. at 25-26.
131. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, arts. 1-2 (affirming the freedom of navigation and
commerce and establishing free ships, free goods doctrine).
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sense, the treaty offered an "Affirmance of an old Rule."'13 2 Yet in allowing
both countries to carry enemy property freely under the free ships, free goods
doctrine, the treaty created a new privilege as an "Exception" to natural
law.' 3
3
Jenkinson's analysis of the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674 corresponds with
Grotius' explanation of treaties that "add something beyond the rights based
on the law of nature." 134 To Jenkinson, treaties become a sort of living
compact among individual nations, upholding their natural rights but also
conferring upon them privileges not guaranteed by natural law. Citing Grotius,
Jenkinson writes that because treaties are contracts, these positive
amendments to natural law can be enjoyed only upon the fulfillment of a
signatory state's obligations. Having violated the terms of their alliance with
Britain, the Dutch must be stripped of their privileges under the treaty of
1674. 31
C. Stalled Diplomacy
The mutuality of the 1674 and 1678 treaties had been a sticking point in
Anglo-Dutch relations from the very start of the Seven Years' War. The
Dutch argued that as long as British privateers harassed their ships, they
would neither enter the war nor deliver aid as the terms of their alliance
required. Why should they enable Britain to wage war, only to become one of
its casualties? 136 The British replied that this trade was unlawful to begin with,
violating the ancient laws of France, 137 treaty rights, and the law of nations.
13 8
Yet neither country was prepared to renegotiate the terms of the treaties
through formal diplomatic channels. The Dutch could not be certain that
negotiations would work in their favor. If Britain did choose to make good on
its threats to nullify the 1674 treaty for failure to fulfill the terms of the Anglo-
Dutch alliance, the Republic stood to lose protection for its lucrative
continental trade under free ships, free goods. Virtually any Dutch trading
vessel would become vulnerable to capture, as all enemy cargo, contraband or
not, would become confiscable. Not only would Dutch ships traveling to and
from North America become moving targets for privateers, but ships sailing
132. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 27. In this spirit, the treaty of 1674 affirmed the parties'
freedom of navigation and trade in the time of peace. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 1.
133. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 27; Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 8.
134. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 394.
135. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 37.
136. Carter, supra note 11, at 118-28.
137. MARRIOTT, supra note 52, at 4.
138. The tone of these claims is encapsulated in an exchange between Hendrik Hop, a Dutch
representative in London, and Secretary of State Holdernesse that occurred in September 1756. Hop
approached the secretary of state demanding the release of several ships captured by a British man of
war, the Rochester. The States General had previously issued a memorial pursuant to this case, but
Britain had yet to make a reply. Holdernesse told Hop that he would have to continue waiting, for "it
could not.., but appear extraordinary to the King, to find the States so very importunate for an answer.
. .when they seemed in no Haste to give One to That [which Yorke] had presented, reclaiming the
defensive alliances equally in Force with the Treaty of 1674." Letter from Richard, Earl of Holdernesse,
Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague (Sept. 8, 1756) (on file with
London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/475).
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between continental ports would fall prey as well.t 39 At the same time, Britain
feared alienating the Republic altogether, thereby driving it to even closer
relations with France. Rather than repudiate the treaty and render a tense
situation explosive, Britain grew increasingly reluctant to act upon assertions
that the treaty was indeed forfeit.
40
In his letter to Ambassador Yorke dated November 28, 1758,
Holdernesse refers to his correspondence of 1756, writing:
[Y]ou will remember, that the Turn of my Dispatches of that Year was, to shew to you,
that all the treaties, subsisting between His Majesty and the States, were equally binding
to the Contracting Parties, and that His Majesty had as much Right to reclaim the
Execution of the Treaty of 1678 and the subsequent defensive Engagements entered into
by the two Nations, as the Dutch have to that of 1674. And that, as the Execution of
mutual Engagements must be reciprocal, His Majesty would have a right to annul the
Treaty of 1674 if the Conditions of the other Treaties subsisting with His Majesty are not
fulfilled by the States [General].
141
The Secretary of State expressed his frustration with Dutch insistence upon
the full execution of the treaty of 1674 while remaining "totally silent as to
their other Engagements with His Majesty."' 142 He wrote that, nonetheless,
"His Majesty is still willing to try whether Negotiation can yet adjust these
Matters; being utterly averse to suffering things to come to Extremity, if It can
be avoided." 143 This concern would persist throughout Anglo-Dutch
discussions on the treaty of 1674. In fact, to Yorke it may have seemed at
times that he was poised at the very edge of extremity, and that all hopes of an
amicable conclusion might be dashed against the rocks.
Thus while the Crown asserted that it had the right to declare the treaty
void, it wielded this legal power as a threat rather than a promise. 144 There
were times when the government used it more gingerly than others. During
the early weeks of 1759, for instance, the British government assumed a
conciliatory tone toward the Dutch. Yorke continued asserting the king's right
to nullify the treaty of 1674-this time "humbly"'14 5-while trying to negotiate
a settlement with deputies of the States General. Yorke's credibility,
meanwhile, was being undermined by the prolonged detention of several
Dutch ships that, he wrote to Holdernesse, "are the burthen of all my
139. In 1755, when debates raged over the position the Dutch Republic should assume in the
impending war, one Dutch official issued a lengthy memorandum urging the government to fulfill its
promise under the 1678 Treaty of Alliance and send 6000 men to Britain. He warned his countrymen
that if they did not fulfill this promise, Britain might, by the law of nations, revoke the terms of the 1674
treaty. CARTER, supra note 11, at 44-49.
140. Alice Carter, How to Revise Treaties Without Negotiating: Commonsense, Mutual Fear
and the Anglo-Dutch Trade Disputes of 1759, in STUDIES IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 214, 215 (Ragnhild
Hatton & M.S. Anderson eds., 1970).
141. Letter from Richard, Earl of Holdernesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British
Ambassador to The Hague (Nov. 28, 1758) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/482).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. In fact, Holdernesse issued separate and secret orders to Yorke, commanding him to
inform the Princess Gouvernante that it was "necessary to assert His Majesty's Right to annul the Treaty
of 1674 but His Majesty only means to assert it, without intending to carry it into Execution, if it can be
avoided." Id.
145. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard, Earl of
Holdernesse, Secretary of State (Jan. 5, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Hollard, 84/482).
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Conversations, and the utter Ruin of their Credit, the Consequence as [the
Dutch negotiators] pretend of their not being restored."'146 Furthermore, the
French ambassador to the Dutch Republic was trying to drive a wedge
between the Dutch and the British by reminding Dutch ministers and any
"other Persons in this Government, who [would] listen to Him with more
Complaisance" that French "Troops were at their Service, in case any Power
in Europe, in revenge for [Dutch] Neutrality, attempted any Thing to their
Prejudice.' 147
Apprehensive that Britain would alienate the Dutch and undermine the
possibility of reaching a negotiated solution, Yorke wrote to Holdemesse:
[T]he Majority of the Nation are utterly averse to a Quarrel with Britain, and, if pushed to
Extremities, may perhaps shew it in a much more convincing Manner than they do at
present; but the Genius of the Country requires violent Situations to engage them to
efficacious Remedies; Britain appears before them at present in the Light of a Power
which tyrannizes by Sea; this cannot be agreeable to them; and they want arguments to
convince them of the contrary.
148
Yet by 1759 it had become clear that arguments alone would not suffice in
redefining the rights of the Dutch to trade as neutrals. While neither side
would broach the question formally through diplomatic channels, informal
discussions were proving no more constructive. Instead, these rights had to be
defined on a case-by-case basis in the courts of admiralty. For as anxiety
mounted in Britain about a possible French invasion, 149 the Dutch Republic
knew it could not deliver the forces required of it under the alliance of 1678 if
called upon by the British for a third time. Since it was not prepared to force
Britain into making good on its threats to nullify Dutch protection under free
ships, free goods altogether, the Republic retreated from its vehement stance
and deferred to the judgments of the British Admiralty. The treaty of 1674,
outdated and ill-adapted to Anglo-Dutch relations of the mid-eighteenth
century, was never renegotiated, nor were its ambiguities ever formally
resolved. As a treaty, it was obsolete; as a bargaining chip, it would prove
indispensable.
In examining the legal strategies proposed by Marriott and Jenkinson,
this Section suggests that the pamphleteers' decision to invoke the legal
authority of Grotius and Bynkershoek was based not only on the inherent
juridical authority of the respective writers but also on a desire to persuade the
Dutch audience of the error of its ways. As Jenkinson himself wrote, "what
makes his [Bynkershoek's] Opinion at this Time of great Importance, is, that
he wrote principally for the Use of the Courts and States of the United
Provinces [of The Netherlands], and generally confirms what he advances, by
their Judgments and Resolutions."'0 The pamphleteers' reliance on the Dutch




149. By 1759, France had placed 40,000 men along the coasts of the British Channel in the
hopes of diverting Britain's attention from its North American campaigns to the defense of its own
borders. 1 CORBETT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
150. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 9-10.
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way for Yorke "to open the Eyes of the [Dutch] Publick."15' There is a certain
irony, then, in the fact that the Dutch ultimately chose to defer resolution of
their legal conflict with Britain to British courts that, in turn, relied on
doctrines championed by Dutch jurists in rendering their decisions.
IV. THE NEW DOCTRINES
Because neither government was able to renegotiate the terms of the
treaty of 1674, the British set out to give the scope of free ships, free goods as
narrow a construction as possible. The doctrine's applicability to enemy ports
in Europe was not disputed; its applicability to colonial ports, however, was
hotly contested. This Section will examine the manner in which public
officials, judges, and lawyers asserted that the treaty privileges could not, in
good faith, be extended to the colonies. It will present a snapshot of the
concept of good faith in international law during the mid-eighteenth century
and will account for the role of this principle in effecting the doctrinal
revolution of the Seven Years' War. Finally, it will trace the emergence of the
Rule of the War of 1756 and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage through an
analysis of relevant case law.
A. Good Faith and the Doctrinal Revolution
The concept of good faith as it pertains to conduct among nations had,
by the mid-eighteenth century, crystallized in two ways. The concept was seen
as a corollary to the Roman law rule of pacta sunt servanda, the notion that
agreements must be kept. 152 In this respect, good faith served as the binding
force of any agreement, whether a contract between individuals or a treaty
between nations. Good faith could also apply to the manner in which people
carried out the terms of their agreements. In this capacity, good faith required
contracting parties to comply with a moral standard of equitable behavior.
153
Recall that by the seventeenth century, it was generally accepted that a
nation at war was entitled to seize the property of its enemy wherever it might
be found. In upholding free ships, free goods, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1674
established a qualified exception to that rule. The treaty also established the
standards against which the good faith of British or Dutch traders could be
measured. In order to enter the territorial waters of either country, a ship had
to show a sea-brief (passport) containing the name of the ship and the name
and nationality of its owner. In order to enter an enemy port, the ship also had
to show its bills of lading (coquets), documents authorized by customs officers
at the vessel's port of departure explaining the contents of its cargo. If the
ship's bills of lading demonstrated that it was carrying contraband, the ship
could be landed and searched by officers of the admiralty. Under no
151. Letter from Yorke, Jan. 2, 1759, supra note 79.
152. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CLASSICAL CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY
INTERPRETATION 138-39 (2001).
153. J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-38 (1991). For a discussion of
the Roman law linkage between pacta sunt servanda and good faith, see id. at 17-23. A discussion of the
normative force attached to good faith can be found in id. at 23-30.
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circumstances was the captor's crew to open, move, or inspect the cargo at
sea. 
154
Richard Lee wrote that if a neutral took enemy goods aboard his ship
and claimed they were his own, he was "certainly guilty of a breach of the
friendship between Us . ..for though the neutral power [might] justly be
allowed to trade with the enemy, under certain restrictions; yet it cannot
possibly be conceived to be lawful to trade for him under sanction of their
name." 55 Trading for the enemy was a violation of good faith, the true test of
neutrality. In this way, the lawfulness of neutral trade came to be defined not
only by its content but also by its intent. As this Section will demonstrate,
neutral trade could, in content and destination, appear to be lawful according
to the letter of the treaty of 1674-it could, for example, consist of non-
contraband enemy goods destined for a continental port. Neutral trade could
also, however, violate the requirement of good faith in that it might undertake
for the enemy what the enemy could not execute for itself-it could, for
example, consist of non-contraband enemy goods being carried indirectly
from an enemy colony that had been closed to the neutral in peacetime, or
worse, be carried out under the cover of false documents.
Good faith among nations was, and still is, considered part of any public
friendship. Indeed, as if delivering a benediction, Grotius concludes De jure
belli ac pacis by writing that "all friendships [should] be safeguarded with the
greatest devotion and good faith.' 156 Accordingly, a neutral could prove his
good faith by doing nothing to support an unjust cause or to impede a just one.
If the neutral felt the relative justice of each cause was ambiguous, he might
aid each side in equal measures. 157 The neutral might also conclude a treaty
with either belligerent upon the outbreak of war, affirming his friendship but
declaring his abstention from the conflict. This declaration, writes Grotius,
would be in keeping with Livy's opinion on neutrality: "'Let them [neutrals]
desire peace with either side, as befits friends; let them not intervene in the
w ar.
,,158
Bynkershoek, who cites the very same passage from Livy, sees a
contradiction in the Grotian position. How can a neutral not intervene in the
war if he is aiding either or both sides directly or indirectly? Richard Lee,
translating Bynkershoek, explains: "[I]n what shape soever we assist one
Party whereby he has any Advantage over the other in the war, we interpose
in the War, which is inconsistent with Friendship." 1 59 Bynkershoek argues that
in order to act in good faith, the neutral must calculate his wartime conduct
with two considerations in mind: first, that his friend's enemy is his friend;
154. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, arts. 7-8. Bills of lading served three legal functions: (1) as
an acknowledgment of a receipt of goods; (2) as evidence of a contract by a shipowner for the transport
of goods; and (3) as a means of establishing property in goods. W.P. BENNET, THE HISTORY AND
PRESENT POSITION OF THE BILL OF LADING AS A DOCUMENT OF TITLE TO GOODS 5-8, 16 (1914). The
forms for British and Dutch bills of lading are appended to the Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, at 279-80.
155. This assertion is an original one, as it does not occur in Bynkershoek's text. LEE, supra
note 45, at 142.
156. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 862.
157. Id. at 786.
158. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 787.
159. LEE, supra note 45, at 140; see also 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 62.
20051
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:549
and second, that his friend is the enemy of his friend. The neutral must
therefore moderate his interaction with one friend according to the possible
consequences it may have on the other. Bynkershoek goes on to criticize the
Grotian view of neutrality, writing that "I cannot agree with the opinion of
many writers on public law who hold that we may and ought to aid the friend
whose cause appears to us the best and most just .... When neither friend has
made any engagement with us why should princes, absolutely independent,
stand or fall by our judgement?' 160 The justness of either cause is to be of no
consequence to the neutral, whose first and foremost obligation in war is to
preserve his friendship with both belligerents without compromising the war
efforts of either.
In addition to governing conduct among non-belligerent nations, good
faith is critical to the enforcement of treaties among them. Bynkershoek writes
that "If you destroy good faith, you destroy all intercourse between princes,
for intercourse depends expressly upon treaties; you even destroy international
law, which has its origin in tacitly accepted and presupposed agreements
founded upon reason and usage."' 61 Because the civil laws that compel people
to uphold their compacts do not hold sway among nations, good faith is the
moral force binding states to their promises. 16 Good faith provides the
philosophical touchstone shared by Bynkershoek and Grotius.
Bynkershoek argues that it is all well and good to say that one has a
rightful claim under the laws of nature, but of what use is this argument to
someone who does not believe or even care that laws of nature exist?
Bynkershoek writes:
We must therefore attack the question with blunter weapons. When [civil] law has
prescribed certain methods of acquiring ownership, we must observe these since no state
can subsist without laws, and very expediency, the mother ... of justice and equity,
commands us to observe the laws. Even expediency obliges the several princes to keep
their word, even though there are no laws between them, for you cannot conceive of
empires without sovereigns, nor of sovereigns without compacts, nor of compacts
without good faith.
63
The distinction Grotius draws between the volitional law of nations and the
laws of nature as applied to the conduct of individual nations is irrelevant to
Bynkershoek, for neither is of any value without good faith. Bynkershoek
presents an alternative view of the law of nations, a view that identifies it as a
single body of positive law founded on reason and custom, determined by
what is expedient, and binding only according to the good faith of its authors
and subjects.164
Bynkershoek's view of the role of good faith in the law of nations and
civil law is very much in keeping with the later Roman law tradition, itself
heavily influenced by Stoic philosophy. In Roman law, two bodies of law-
160. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 62.
161. Id. at 190.
162. Id. at 191.
163. Id. at 192.
164. For an analysis of the conspicuous lack of natural law theory in Bynkershoek's
Quaestionum juris publici in comparison to his earlier works, see AKASHI, supra note 8, at 29-33. See
also id. at 50-51 for a discussion of good faith as the binding force of the ius gentium.
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the ius gentium and the ius civile-existed alongside one another. The ius
civile was binding only upon Roman citizens. The ius gentium, on the other
hand, was binding upon all men.1 65 Originally perceived as a product of man's
natural capacity for reason, it constituted a body of law common to all
humankind-hence Bynkershoek's assertion that we must "examine the
dictates of reason, whose authority is so great in defining the law of
nations."' 16 6 To Grotius, the non-volitional law of nations-natural law-is
also defined by reason insofar as reason is part of human nature. Grotius
imbued this law with moral weight, writing that "[tihe law of nature is a
dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not
in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or
moral necessity.',
167
In the Quaestionum, Bynkershoek warns the reader that to disregard
good faith in public agreements is to travel the slippery slope to Machiavellian
politics, for that "master of iniquity in his Principe teaches that treachery is
lawful for princes, saying that any and every method of securing the safety of
the state is honourable provided only it makes a pretence at being
honourable."168 Charles Jenkinson defines the importance of good faith in
upholding treaties in similar terms:
Those scandalous Maxims of policy, which have brought Disgrace both on the Name and
Profession [of statecraft], took their Rise from the Conduct of the little Principalities of
Italy ... and their refined Shifts and Evasions formed into Systems by the Able Doctors
of their Councils, have composed that Science, which the World hath called Politics, a
Science of Fraud and Deceit... as if there could be no Morality among Nations, and that
Mankind, being formed into Civil Societies, and collectively considered, were set free
from all Rules of Honour and Virtue. 1
69
Bynkershoek writes that this doctrine has been "long since exploded,'
' 70
having been replaced by the idea that each contract implicitly contains a
clause holding that its provisions are valid only rebus sic stantibus. In this
way, writes Bynkershoek, a compact may be deemed invalid "(1) if a new
condition has arisen suitable for reopening discussion; (2) if circumstances
have come to a pass that one cannot take action; (3) if the reasons that
promoted the alliance have ceased to exist; [or] (4) if the needs of the state or
expedience demand a different course."' 7 He writes that, by following this
doctrine, "you would hardly save yourself from Machiavellianism, if you
would slink off to these dens of treachery with the itching soul of a prince.' 72
He cites Queen Elizabeth's conduct with respect to a 1585 treaty whose terms
she had broken. 173 The States General issued an admonition against
165. O'CONNOR, supra note 153, at 12-13.
166. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 20.
167. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 7, at 38-39.
168. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 190.
169. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 24.
170. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 190.
171. Id. at 190.
172. Id. at 190.
173. In the Treaty of Nonsuch of September 4, 1585, Britain agreed to deploy substantial
military forces to the Low Countries in order to defend the Dutch from Spanish conquest. As security for
this expensive undertaking, the Dutch agreed to invite two British men to sit in the Dutch States General
and help oversee the vulnerable country's finances. By 1594, Queen Elizabeth was selling off Crown
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Elizabeth's conduct, to which Bynkershoek tells us the British government
"made the most absurd answer, saying that 'the contracts of princes rested
only upon a pledge, and that they were not binding if they resulted in
detriment to the state. "1
74
James Marriott, however, relies upon the principle of rebus sic stantibus
in determining whether the free ships, free goods doctrine still applied to the
Dutch under the treaty of 1674. A commercial treaty, he writes, "which is very
different in its Objects, and its Consequences, from a Treaty of Peace, extends
no farther in its Obligation than to the general State of Commerce in
existence, and view at the time of contracting." 175 He too refers to Elizabeth's
reply to the States General in 1595, this time as an example of the legitimacy
of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. In order to understand the wording of a
treaty, he explains, one must understand the intention of its authors; to
understand their intention, one must know the circumstances under which they
concluded the compact. It therefore follows that in order to understand
whether the wording of the treaty of 1674 included the French colonial trade,
one must know whether the authors intended it to be included within the scope
of the free ships, free goods provision. In order to understand their intention,
one must find out whether it was possible for the colonial trade to be included
in the treaty given the "general State of Commerce in existence and view at
the time of contracting." 76 Because trade with the French colonies was closed
to the Dutch in peacetime and in war when the treaty was concluded, Marriott
writes, it cannot be assumed that the contracting parties intended to include
such trade within the treaty's scope. 177 The British government adopted
precisely this position in addressing claims by the Dutch Republic that its
subjects at home and in the colonies "should be treated in regard to this
navigation and commerce on the same footing as the most-favored nations"
and that its trade should be left "free and without hindrance."
' 178
B. The Rule of the War of1756
The groundwork for a limited interpretation of the 1674 treaty had been
laid during the War of Austrian Succession in a series of prize cases,179 the
lands in order to help subsidize the British forces in the Low Countries. Embroiled in a deepening war
with Spain, she demanded that the Dutch begin to repay their debt or, at least, assume the responsibility
of paying the British troops stationed in the Low Countries. Notwithstanding attempts by John van
Oldenbarnevelt, Dutch statesman and patron of Hugo Grotius, to come to an accommodation with
Elizabeth, the Dutch States General refused to meet any of her demands. The States General argued that,
in the absence of any provision in the Treaty of Nonsuch requiring a financial accounting prior to the
end of the war, Elizabeth could make no such demands upon them. For a discussion of the diplomatic
history surrounding this episode, see WALLACE T. MACCAFFREY, ELIZABETH I: WAR AND POLITICS
1588-1603, at 270-81 (1992). See also PAUL E.J. HAMMER, ELIZABETH'S WARS: WAR, GOVERNMENT,
AND SOCIETY IN TUDOR ENGLAND 1544-1604, at 118-20 (2003).
174. 1 BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 17, at 194.
175. MARuoIrr, supra note 34, at 11.
176. Id. at 11.
177. Id. at 10-13.
178. Extrait du Registre, supra note 35 ("seront trait~s par rapport h cette navigation et ce
Commerce sur le mime pied que les Nations les plus favorisegs" and that its trade should be left "libre et
sans empechement").
179. Richard Pares has dealt with this topic in Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-
1763. PARES, supra note 16. Unless noted, however, the cases cited herein are not discussed in his work.
The Seven Years' War
first of which was the Eindraght, decided on June 19, 1744. I" ° The Lords
Commissioners for Prize Appeals ordered the restoration of the Dutch ship
and its cargo, captured en route from Rotterdam to Nantes, to its owners.
Although the ship's captain had produced all the documentation required of
him under the treaty of 1674 when stopped by a British privateer, the ship had
nevertheless been captured on the suspicion that it was carrying contraband
goods. The court ruled that under the treaty, suspicion alone was not sufficient
grounds on which to capture a neutral ship: "His Majesty's Orders are very
strong that this Treaty may be religiously observed., 181 Since the captain of
the Dutch ship had complied with the treaty provisions, the court ruled that his
ship could not be lawfully detained, much less condemned as prize. In
delivering its decision, the court noted that "[t]his is the first Cause in this
War upon the Treaty [of] 1674." 1" It would not be the last. In this ruling, the
court set the standard for the close construction of the 1674 Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. 83
In a letter of January 8, 1746, civil lawyer George Lee' answered a
question concerning the strict interpretation of the treaty of 1674.114 French
and Spanish ships had begun obtaining Dutch passes in order to trade between
ports in the French colonies, claiming protection under the treaty's free ships,
free goods provision. The ships would hire a Dutch master, set sail under
Dutch colors, and carry false bills of lading, all the while claiming that the
vessels were destined for Holland. Yet "many of these Dutch masters [were]
not natives of Holland but French, Irish and of other nations made Burghers
by the States of Holland and their crews for the greatest part [were]
French." 185 Although these ships could technically supply all the
documentation required by the Treaty of 1674, the question remained whether
they were engaging in legitimate trade. Lee replied that they were not, and
that a British privateer could lawfully seize a ship trading under these
conditions "notwithstanding the Treaty of 1674." 186 Enemy cargo found
aboard the ship would be condemned, but the ship itself, if owned by
Dutchmen, would be restored to its owners. Lee explains that transporting
enemy goods "from one port to another of the enemy is not priviledged [sic.]
by the said Treaty of 1674 and cannot protect the enemy's goods."' 8 7 He was
completely silent, however, on the legitimacy of protecting what was
essentially a French trade with Dutch papers.
The author hopes they will shed some light on the manner in which the problem of interpreting the 1674
treaty led to the development of the two doctrines treated herein.
180. Information collected from an admiralty report on the Eindraght. Case of the Eindraght
(June 19, 1744) (on file with London PRO, High Court of Admiralty, 30/875/14).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lee became Dean of the Arches in 1751. JOSEPH TIMOTHY HAYDN, THE BOOK OF
DIGNITIES 420 (1970). He then became a Commissioner for Prize Appeals in 1752. PARES, supra note
16, at 105.
184. Letter from George Lee to Unknown Recipient (Jan. 8, 1746) (on file with London PRO,
High Court of Admiralty, 30/875), reprinted in REGINALD MARSDEN, REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED
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This problem arose during the Seven Years' War, when the adoption of
ships underwent a different permutation. Now France, again an enemy of the
British, was once more inviting Dutch ships to participate in a trade formerly
closed to all but French ships. The prize courts had to decide whether these
Dutch ships thereby forfeited their protection under the treaty of 1674.188 Did
Dutch ships, by undertaking what had once been an exclusively French trade,
cease to be Dutch? Had they acquired the character of French enemy ships?
The case of a Dutch ship, aptly named the America, settled these
questions. Dealing with the first condemnation of a Dutch ship in the Seven
Years' War, the case established the Rule of the War of 1756. The America
delivered a cargo of French-owned goods to Santo Domingo, a French
possession, where it took on a cargo of colonial goods. While en route to
Europe, the ship was intercepted by a British privateer. The master
immediately began throwing the ship's papers overboard, destroying the bills
of lading in order to conceal the cargo from the privateers. When brought to
appeal, the Lords Commissioners condemned both the ship and its cargo as
lawful prize on the grounds that the vessel had assumed the character of a
French ship. Employed by French merchants, trading with a French colony,
and carrying French papers, the ship was no longer bona fide Dutch in
character but French. The case established the legal principle that no neutral
could participate during wartime in a trade closed to him in time of peace. 189 It
also marked the acceptance by Dutch traders of British adjudication as a
legitimate means of defining trading rights during war. As Ambassador Yorke
wrote, "[e]very Body is in such hopes that the Differences between the Two
Nations will be speedily adjusted, and I must do Justice to the Trading Towns
of this Country, that notwithstanding their Clamors, they have universally
Approved the Sentence pronounced against the Ship America, by the Lords
Commissioners of Appeals.'
90 °
The trade undertaken by the Dutch on behalf of French colonies in the
West Indies was of particular concern to British officials. One letter by
Holdernesse condemned the Dutch assumption of trade in Martinique and
Santo Domingo ever since France "opened her American ports to Nations who
profess Neutrality in the present War."' 191 The Dutch colonies of St. Eustatius
and Curagao, little more than "barren settlements" in peacetime, were
suddenly transformed into "grand magazines for the Produce of Martinico and
St. Domingo" as "vast fleets [were] now sailing continually from those
insignificant Ports laden with Enemy's Property" 192 -this despite the
Admiralty's condemnation of trade with French colonies from the very outset
of the war.
A letter written in the early days of the war by the king's advocate,
George Hay, reflects this state of affairs. An advocate representing the case of
188. PARES, supra note 16, at 196-97.
189. PARES, supra note 16, at 197-98, 201-02; see also O.H. Mootham, The Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage, 1756-1815, 8 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L. L. 63, 63-67 (1927).
190. Letter from Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague, to Richard Holdemesse,
Secretary of State (May 8, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/484).
191. Letter from Richard Holdemesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador
to The Hague (Feb. 9, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/483).
192. Id.
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a certain James Colladon asked Hay for advice on points of law. He wished to
know whether "any persons besides the subjects of France [could] trade to
Martinico without its being deemed a contraband trade" and whether his
client, a Genevan, might be allowed to trade there. Hay firmly replied that, in
general, no one but French subjects might trade with Martinique. Hence the
Rule of the War of 1756 prevented neutral powers from undertaking activities
in time of war that had been illicit in time of peace. In essense, it ensured that
the trading rights enjoyed in peacetime were identical to those enjoyed in time
of war.
C. The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage
In his 1759 Letter to the Dutch Merchants in Britain, James Marriott
described the illicit colonial trade discussed by Hay and Colladon. Dutch
merchants would load their ships with goods on the continent and set sail for
their colonies in the West Indies. There they would consign the cargo to an
agent who would, in turn, consign the goods to French barques that had sailed
into the harbor or come ashore. The French boats would take aboard
continental goods in exchange for colonial goods such as "Coffees, Sugar,
Indigo"--"the growth of the French Islands, and which are well known, never
to have been the Growth of the barren Soil of those Islands which are
inhabited by Dutch Subjects." 194 These goods would be brought back to
continental ports under colorable Dutch papers, but they were often actually
transported on French account.195 Dutch ships would claim to be destined for
the Dutch West Indies but would sail on to French islands, where they would
pick up colonial goods. They would then sail back to Dutch colonies and
complete their voyage back to the continent. The whole process was known as
"transshipping,"1 96 and as a result of it, Marriott wrote that "the Properties of
Dutchmen and Frenchmen have become as inseparably blended as their
National Characters, in the American World, have long been equivocal."'
197
The same principle that gave rise to the Rule of the War of 1756 would
also give rise to the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage, the legal doctrine
through which transshipping was suppressed. Through transshipping, the
neutral might avoid acknowledging any intermediate stops he made in French
colonies while trading between the Dutch West Indies and the continent. A
Dutch captain might destroy bills of lading issued in French colonial ports and
retain only those issued in neutral ports, presenting the latter when stopped by
a British ship for inspection. Such practices were not exclusively Dutch, as
evidenced by the earliest application of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage.
193. Letter from George Hay, King's Advocate, to Unknown Recipient (Sept. 18, 1756) (on
file with London PRO, High Court of Admiralty, 30/875).
194. MARRIOTT, supra note 52, at 18.
195. Id. at 18-19.
196. For further discussion of transshipping, see PARES, supra note 16, at 204-05.
197. MARRIOTr, supra note 52, at 20. Marriott seems to have borne a general hostility toward
the colonial character. In 1778, his first year as judge on the High Court of Admiralty, Marriott would
condemn an American law as proof "that conquerors and new settlers in all ages have adopted, in a very
great degree, the manners of the ancient inhabitants, and taken even the features, colours, and temper of
the climate." RoSCOE, supra note 15, at 32-33.
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In 1756, a British privateer captured the Spanish ship Jesus Maria Joseph.
The ship had taken on a cargo at Corunna, a Spanish port, which had been
transferred from a French ship that had sailed into the harbor. The Spanish
vessel was captured en route to San Sebastian, another Spanish port, whence it
was to set sail for France. 198
The Prize Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's condemnation of
the cargo as lawful prize on the grounds that the entire transportation "from
the French island to Corunna, from Corunna to San Sebastian, and thence to a
port of Old France" could be considered as a single transportation of enemy
goods aboard a neutral ship, regardless of the transshipping. 199 In delivering
his opinion on the case, Lord Hardwicke conceded that although Spain might
enjoy treaty protection under the free ships, free goods doctrine,20 ° the
purpose of such treaties was "to leave the neutral with the same advantages,
no better and no worse off in war than in peace., 201 Since Spain could not
carry French colonial goods in peacetime, it could not carry them in war,
either directly or indirectly from French colonies.
The practice of transshipping seemed to support Holdernesse's assertion
that to profess one's neutrality and to behave in a manner befitting a neutral
were two entirely different things.20 2 In the same letter, the Secretary of State
noted that "whatever shall be bona fide, Dutch property, & be conveyed from
the Dutch settlements to Europe in Dutch bottoms, will be unmolested, [yet] at
the same time ... the Dutch for their own sake, must take proper measures to
verify clearly & distinctly, who are bona fide the owners of their American
vessels., 20 3 In a subsequent letter, he remarked that the only way the Dutch
could prove their good faith was by submitting for examination the documents
required of Dutch and British merchants alike by the treaty of 1674. He
understood that this examination was a delicate issue,2°4 but if the Dutch were
to enjoy the treaty privilege of free ships, free goods, they had to uphold their
treaty obligations as well. Besides, he wrote, "honest and fair traders have
nothing to apprehend from it, and as to those who carry on the illicit trade, it is
fit, they should be detected and punished., 205
198. For a more detailed account of the case, see PARES, supra note 16, at 217-21.
199. Mootham, supra note 189, at 65-66.
200. The Anglo-Spanish treaty of 1667 upheld the principle that unfrTee ships make unfree
goods, but it was silent on the question of whether Spain would enjoy protection under free ships, free
goods. This question had yet to be resolved by the Seven Years' War. PARES, supra note 16, at 175-76.
British officials tended to approach Spanish captures with kid gloves so as not to antagonize Spain. They
sometimes unofficially pressured privateers to release Spanish ships they captured. PARES, supra note
16, at 285-89. It is therefore understandable that Dutch merchants hoped Britain might take the same
pains on their behalf.
201. Id. at 220.
202. Letter from Richard Holdemesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador
to The Hague (Feb. 9, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/483).
203. Id.
204. In a letter to Yorke, Holdemesse told the Ambassador that negotiations on this issue
would constitute "the most delicate part of your commission" and advised him not to raise the matter
unless it, "of itself, [should] come upon the carpet." Letter from Richard Holdernesse, Secretary of State,
to Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador to The Hague (Nov. 28, 1758) (on file with London PRO, State
Papers, Holland, 84/482).
205. Letter from Richard Holdernesse, Secretary of State, to Joseph Yorke, British Ambassador
to The Hague (May 18, 1759) (on file with London PRO, State Papers, Holland, 84/484).
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As Holdemesse pointed out, Britain could find out whether a Dutch ship
was in fact trading in good faith only by intercepting it at sea and subjecting it
to examination. Given the abusive treatment they often received at the hands
of privateers, it is little surprise that the Dutch should have questioned the
British claim to the right to search their ships on the high seas. Charles
Jenkinson approaches this problem from the standpoint of sovereign rights.
Having already explained the origins of a belligerent's right by the laws of
nature to seize enemy property, he goes on to explore the neutral's right to
protect it. Jenkinson concedes that it is unlawful for a belligerent to seek out
enemy property within neutral dominion, for here "the trial, which the law of
nations gives is, as it were, superseded., 206 Within the boundaries of neutral
territory, the law of nations must yield to the civil laws of the state. Far from
coexisting in the state of nature as sovereign nations do, individual subjects
within civil society have conferred upon their government the power of
dominion over themselves. Dominion, Jenkinson writes, "gives a right of
enacting laws, of establishing new jurisdictions, and of making all (whether its
own subjects or those of other countries) submit to these, who come within the
pale of its power., 20 7 Thus the right to protect enemy property is coterminous
with the bounds of the neutral's dominion. But since the neutral cannot hold
dominion over the seas, Jenkinson states, his right of protecting enemy
property cannot extend to the seas either. Regardless of nationality, origin, or
destination, a ship on the high seas is traveling on "the public road of the
universe, the law of which is the law of nations, and all that pass thereon are
subject to it, without either privilege or exemption." 208
The case of the Dutch ship De Fortuyn illustrates this argument. The
ship sailed for Cape Frangois in French Santo Domingo carrying a French
license to trade there. After it dropped anchor in Monte Christi, a Spanish port
on Hispaniola, three British privateers captured the ship. They brought De
Fortuyn to Jamaica for trial despite the protestations of the Spanish governor
of the island, who boarded the ship and demanded its release. A colonial vice-
admiralty court condemned both ship and cargo as good prize on the ground
that the ship was covering French trade. The owners of the ship appealed the
court's decision, and on June 12, 1760, the Lords of Appeals overturned the
lower court's ruling. They agreed that the ship and cargo were indeed
confiscable. However, because the ship had been taken within Spanish
jurisdiction and in a port belonging to the king of Spain, "within reach of his
cannon and under his protection," 209 the court ordered the ship and cargo
returned to the claimant or the full value of both restored.210
When Britain found itself confronting a crisis of Dutch trading rights
during the Seven Years' War, an array of juridical concepts were available to
the prize courts, enabling them to initiate doctrinal change. The principles
206. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 7.
207. Id. at 7.
208. Id. at 8.
209. Bynkershoek explains the principle informing this rule in De dominio maris. Because
dominion is coextensive with the ability to occupy something, "the power of the land properly ends
where the force of arms ends. Therefore, the sea can be considered subject as far as the range of cannon
extends." BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 66, at 44.
210. A record of this case is reproduced in MARSDEN, supra note 184, at 175.
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governing treaty construction rendered it possible for the British to invalidate
the treaty of 1674 on the grounds that the Dutch were acting in bad faith in
undertaking French colonial trade, and that general conditions had changed so
dramatically as to render a strict application of the treaty subversive of the
intentions of the signatory parties. Applying the principle of good faith, the
Lords Commissioners of Prize Appeals determined, in the case of the Dutch
ship America, that a ship participating in a trade that had been closed to it in
time of peace was not acting in good faith and thereby assumed an enemy
character. Thus was the Rule of the War of 1756 born. Similarly, the case law
and correspondence surrounding such cases as the Jesus Maria Joseph and De
Fortuyn demonstrate the role that the principle of good faith played in the
emergence of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage. For by failing to report
intermediate stops, the illegal practice of transshipping became a means by
which the Dutch could undertake the French colonial trade. The Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage put an end to the ultimate transport of goods to a
blockaded state by requiring that the trading ship account for all intermediate
stops during the course of its voyage.
V. CONCLUSION
In his Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great-Britain in
the Present War, Charles Jenkinson writes:
About the middle .. of the last Century, when the Commercial Regulations, which at
present subsist between the European Powers, first began to be formed, it became
absolutely necessary to call back the Attention of Governments to those Principles of
Natural Right, from whence They had strayed; and to fix, and determine, what was the
Law of Nations, by the Articles of their respective Treaties[.] 21'
Out of this process emerged the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Navigation and
Commerce of 1674, upholding the free ships, free goods doctrine and a mutual
"freedom of navigation and commerce ' '22 between the two nations. Less than
a century later, Britain was once again engaging in the same sort of inquiry,
trying to formulate viable solutions to contemporary commercial problems
through recourse to natural law theory and the law of nations. This time,
however, a treaty could not provide a resolution. Instead, British prize courts
became the venue in which the matter was settled.
The "Principles of Natural Right ' 213 in which British lawyers and
statesmen sought the solution to the contemporary crisis of neutral rights had
been set forth by Grotius and Bynkershoek. To both writers, the sum total of
natural rights was defense of one's own rights and possessions, and respect for
those of others. However, each writer's conception of human nature
delineated the manner in which the individual person or nation could exercise
those rights. For both Grotius and Bynkershoek, the laws of nature permit any
and all measures against the enemy. To Grotius, however, the law of
nations-the sum total of reason, custom, and treaty rights-determines
211. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 26.
212. Treaty of 1674, supra note 12, art. 2.
213. JENKINSON, supra note 112, at 26.
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belligerent rights according to man's natural desire to seek peace. Likewise,
the desire to seek peace requires that the neutral try to bring the war to an end
as quickly as possible by doing nothing to disadvantage the just cause and
nothing to advantage the unjust one. To Bynkershoek, on the other hand,
humanity's natural self-interest justifies the belligerent's destruction of the
enemy by any means necessary to defend itself. The law of nations-again, a
positive body of law and custom with roots in natural reason-like the law of
nature requires that the neutral do nothing to advantage or disadvantage either
side.
As Jenkinson's pamphlet demonstrates, the natural law theories and jus
gentium jurisprudence of Bynkershoek and Grotius were not incompatible. In
fact, Jenkinson rendered them compatible by cobbling together a composite
theory of neutrality out of Grotian natural law theory and Bynkershoek's
permissive view of wartime right. Ultimately, however, Bynkershoek's
conception of neutrality carried the day in Britain, for the systems of wartime
rights he propounded were most relevant to the scale and objectives of the
Seven Years' War, a global war waged on battlefields and trade routes alike.
The practical dimensions of this struggle were played out in prize courts,
where the combatants were litigants trying to defend their property and
trading rights.
Although concerned with technical points of law, the Rule of the War of
1756 and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage at once affirmed the benefits of
privileged neutrality and limited the rights of neutrals in war. They did not
overhaul the doctrine of free ships, free goods, nor did they even question its
legitimacy. Instead, these new rules circumscribed the doctrine's scope to only
those trades that had been open to the Dutch in peacetime, creating stringent
standards against which good faith in international trade could be measured.
In fact, these standards constituted the means by which conflicting legal rights
could be reconciled in wartime. The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage set a
measure by which good faith in trade could be demonstrated through
documentary proof. A Dutch ship stopped by a British privateer in the
Caribbean need only show its papers to demonstrate that it was trading in
good faith. Furthermore, the Rule of the War of 1756 established a legal
mechanism by which treaty obligations would be upheld when undertaken in
good faith, rendering it impossible for the scope of a commercial treaty to be
broadened ex post facto.
Thus in 1756, when it again "became absolutely necessary to call back
the Attention of Governments to those Principles of Natural Right, from
whence they had strayed,, 21 4 the paths that governments followed were not
entirely the same. Indeed, Britain and the Dutch Republic still subscribed to
the Grotian view of humanity's natural sociability, as is evidenced by
Jenkinson's pamphlet; their path, however, was now cobbled with cruder
stones, for the Grotian conception of just war was no longer of concern to the
neutral in determining its conduct with respect to belligerents. Instead, a
positivist theory of neutrality began to take hold when, in order "to fix, and
determine, what was the Law of Nations, by the Articles of their respective
214. Id.
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Treaties," 215 the prize courts generated two humble solutions with profound
ramifications: the Rule of the War of 1756 and the Doctrine of Continuous
Voyage.
The practical ramifications of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage persist
to this day. International legal scholarship has recently begun to recognize that
the doctrine is relevant to problems for enforcement and interdiction in
contemporary international affairs. In an article aptly titled The Feigned
Demise of Prize,216 David Bederman notes the potential utility of the doctrine
for the enforcement of U.N. sanctions prohibiting the export of contraband to
targeted countries. He writes:
It has certainly become notorious that UN sanctions have been unsuccessful because of
those countries willing to allow contraband to cross their borders into the sanctioned
State. A doctrine of continuous voyage ... would, in short, shift the presumption that the




Instead, such a presumption would render the ultimate destination of cargo
218probative of the nature of the voyage. This permutation of the doctrine
could play a role in the legal regime that will emerge around the recently
launched Proliferation Security Initiative, enabling participating states to
undertake interdictions where the ultimate destination of weapons of mass
destruction and their components is a rogue state or a terrorist organization.219
Although a full consideration of the ramifications of applying the Doctrine of
Continuous Voyage to contemporary international challenges lies beyond the
scope of this Essay, the viability of the doctrine merits mention.
This Essay has mapped the emergence of the Rule of the War of 1756
and the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage in the British prize courts of the
Seven Years' War. It has shown, through the events and debates surrounding
the emergence of these doctrines, how wartime exigencies may force public
officials to reassess the basic principles that inform their understanding of
international law. For British legal practitioners and statesmen of the Seven
Years' War, this reassessment prompted an intellectual alignment with the
legal thought of Bynkershoek and a doctrine of neutrality reflecting a
commitment to positivism that has characterized international law throughout
the modem period.
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